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SURROGACY AND THE POLITICS OF
COMMODIFICATION
ELIZABETH S. SCOTT*

I
INTRODUCTION
In 2004, the Illinois legislature passed the Gestational Surrogacy Act, which
provides that a child conceived through in vitro fertilization (IVF) and born to a
surrogate mother automatically becomes the legal child of the intended parents
at birth if certain conditions are met. Under the Act, the woman who bears the
child has no parental status.1 The bill generated modest media attention, but
little controversy;2 it passed unanimously in both houses of the legislature and
was signed into law by the governor.3
This mundane story of the legislative process in action stands in sharp
contrast to the political tale of surrogacy that unfolded in the 1980s and early
1990s as the Baby M case4 left its mark on American law. It was through the
lens of Baby M that this innovative use of reproductive technology was first
scrutinized as an issue of social, political, and legal interest.5 Over the course of
the litigation between the intended parents, William and Elizabeth Stern, and
the surrogate mother, Mary Beth Whitehead, hostility toward commercial
surrogacy6 arrangements hardened. Opponents of surrogacy—mostly feminists
and religious groups—argued that the contracts were baby-selling arrangements
that exploited poor women who either were coerced or did not understand the
consequences of their decisions. Opponents argued that surrogacy degraded the
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1. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/1-75 (2006); see infra notes 90–96 and accompanying text.
2. See Judith Graham, State Sets Standards on Surrogacy Birth; Legislation Called Most Liberal in
U.S., CHI. TRIB., Jan. 2, 2005, at C1.
3. Id.
4. In the Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
5. See infra notes 22–30 and accompanying text for a description of the Baby M trial and appeal.
6. In this article “surrogacy” refers to commercial surrogacy, in which a woman is paid to carry
and bear the product of her egg and donor sperm or an implanted, fertilized donor egg. Compare “gift
surrogacy,” in which a woman agrees to carry and bear another’s child without payment.
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female reproductive function and undermined the family. This framing of the
transaction as illegitimate commodification was adopted by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Baby M and prevailed for several years thereafter, with farreaching effects on legal regulation. By the early 1990s, many states had enacted
laws prohibiting or severely restricting surrogacy agreements.7 Some observers
predicted the end of this particular use of reproductive technology.8
But that did not happen. In fact, the politics and social meaning of surrogacy
arrangements have slowly changed, and the alarm and hostility that surrounded
this issue have diminished substantially. An alternative frame has emerged, in
which altruistic surrogates (contractually bound and compensated nonetheless)
provide the “gift of life” to deserving couples who otherwise would be unable to
have children. News stories about surrogacy arrangements in the past decade
have tended to be upbeat, human-interest tales describing warm relationships
between surrogates and the couples for whom they bear children9—a far cry
from the acrimonious battle between Ms. Whitehead and the Sterns over Baby
M.
The political and judicial response to surrogacy has also changed in recent
years. In Illinois and other states, the contemporary legislative approach has
been largely pragmatic, driven by a perception that parties will continue to
enter these agreements and thus, that it is important to have procedures that
establish parental status in intended parents.10 In the absence of statutory
authority, several courts, including the California Supreme Court, have also
enforced gestational-surrogacy contracts and have held that the intended
parents can be named on the birth certificate.11 Although social conservatives
7. The New York statute passed in 1992 was reported to be the eighteenth statute prohibiting or
severely restricting commercial surrogacy contracts. See George E. Curry, New York State May Bar
Mothers for Hire, Surrogate Parenting for Pay at Issue, CHI. TRIB., May 31, 1992, at 17; sources cited
infra note 53.
8. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
9. See Gina Bellefante, Surrogate Mothers’ New Niche: Bearing Babies for Gay Couples, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 2005, at A1 (profiling various surrogacy relationships between women and gay
couples); Judy Keen, Surrogates Relish Unique Role; And Science Has a Place in the Family Too, USA
TODAY, Jan. 23, 2007, at D1 (profiling the positive surrogacy relationship between a woman and a gay
couple); Raina Kelley et al., The Curious Lives of Surrogates, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 29, 2008, at 44
(describing surrogacy as “[a]n act of love, but also a financial transaction, that brings people together”);
Alex Kuczynski, Her Body, My Baby: My Adventures with a Surrogate Mom, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov.
30, 2008, at 42 (describing the author’s experience as an intended parent); Monica Rogers, The Birth of
a New Tradition; Showers for Surrogates, CHI. TRIB., July 13, 2005, at C1 (describing baby showers
thrown for surrogate mothers); Brigid Schulte, Sharing the Gift of Life, WASH. POST, May 4, 2008, at
C1 (profiling the positive relationship between a surrogate mother, surrogate daughter, and intended
parents after fourteen years). Tina Fey and Amy Poehler recently starred in BABY MAMA (Universal
Pictures 2008), a wacky comedy about a surrogacy arrangement gone awry that got mixed reviews but
grossed
approximately
$70,000,000.
See
Baby
Mama,
http://www.boxofficemojo.com/
movies/?id=babymama.htm (last visited May 19, 2009).
10. See, e.g., infra notes 89–93 and accompanying text.
11. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (enforcing contract over gestational mother’s
objection); Doe v. Roe, 717 A.2d 706 (Conn. 1998) (holding that trial court had jurisdiction to approve
surrogacy agreement); In re Roberto D.B., 923 A.2d 115 (Md. 2007) (reversing lower court’s refusal to
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continue to speak out against surrogacy in the political arena,12 most
contemporary groups interested in this issue advocate in favor of laws enforcing
the arrangements.13
This account raises a number of puzzling questions. How did it happen that
surrogacy was framed as baby selling during the Baby M litigation? And why
did the case generate such powerful emotional, ideological, and political
responses that, institutionalized through legislation, continue to define the law
in many states? Just as important—why did the politics and social meaning of
surrogacy change, such that a more sanguine view of the practice seems to have
emerged in recent years? Why did interest groups, particularly feminists, that
played such a key role in advocating restrictive laws after Baby M, mobilize
during the litigation and then over time seemingly lose interest in this issue?
This article explores the history of surrogacy over the past twenty years in an
effort to shed some light on these questions.
A roadmap of the essay may be helpful. Section II offers a historical account
of the legal and social issues surrounding surrogacy over the past twenty years.
These issues present the puzzle that the rest of the article seeks to resolve.
Section III examines how surrogacy was framed as commodification in the Baby
M context. Although opponents of surrogacy had legitimate concerns about
unfamiliar uses of reproductive technology, the political and legal responses to
this case were to a considerable extent a combination of moral panic and
interest-group politics. The vivid drama of Baby M came to symbolize the
pernicious threat that commercialization of reproductive technology posed to
conventional understandings of the family and of motherhood. Opinion leaders,
primarily religious groups and feminists, reinforced the moral panic and formed
an unlikely but effective coalition that persisted for several years. Of particular
interest is the role of feminists in the political arena and why they ultimately
unified in a stance favoring legal prohibition of surrogacy that was in tension
with other feminist views about reproductive agency. In section IV, I seek to
explain how and why the social and political meanings of surrogacy have
changed over the past decade. Several factors have been important: The moral
panic has dissipated, as many of the predicted harms have not been realized.
Further, advances in IVF have expanded the use of gestational surrogacy,
which, because the surrogate is not genetically related to the baby, was less
remove the surrogate mother’s name from a birth certificate when both the surrogate mother and the
genetic intended parent desired that the surrogate’s name be removed); Culliton v. Beth Israel
Deaconess Med. Cntr., 756 N.E.2d 1133 (Mass. 2001) (hospital ordered to place gestational intended
parents’ names on birth certificate); A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2000) (allowing
birth certificate naming intended, genetic parents to issue after a waiting period, but refusing to enforce
a pre-birth contract terminating the surrogate mother’s parental rights); J.F. v D.B., 879 N.E.2d 749
(Ohio 2007) (holding gestational-surrogacy contract was not against public policy and should be
enforced); J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (Utah 2002) (Utah statute prohibiting recording of genetic
parents’ names on birth certificate held unconstitutional as an undue burden on the fundamental right
to procreate).
12. See, e.g., infra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., infra notes 94–101 and accompanying text.
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readily framed as commodification and thus was more palatable than traditional
surrogacy.14 Finally, the interest-group dynamic has changed: women’s groups
have withdrawn their engagement with the issue, perhaps because their
arguments against surrogacy were increasingly adopted by anti-abortion
advocates. These conditions have contributed to a political climate in which
lawmakers have adopted a pragmatic approach, authorizing surrogacy
arrangements while seeking to minimize potential tangible harms. In a liberal
society, this stance seems like the correct governmental response to a social
practice that some continue to view with concern but about which no consensus
exists.
II
THE FRAMING AND REFRAMING OF SURROGACY: A BRIEF HISTORY
A. Baby M: Surrogacy as Commodification
Political philosophers offer two objections to the commodification of certain
transactions. The first focuses on coercion; exchanges that are driven by severe
inequality, ignorance, or dire economic necessity are problematic.15 The second
objection focuses on corruption and holds that the market has a degrading
effect on certain goods and practices.16 As the Baby M case unfolded, both
objections were aimed at surrogacy, effectively framing the transactions as illicit
commodification. Opponents claimed that surrogacy unfairly exploited poor
women who unwillingly entered contracts that they would come to regret.17
Critics also claimed that surrogacy degraded children and women by treating
children as commodities to be exchanged for profit and women’s bodies as
childbearing factories; the arrangements also degraded the mother–child
relationship by paying women not to bond with their children.18
Surrogacy arrangements were not completely unfamiliar to lawmakers or to
the public in 1986, when the Baby M story first attracted media attention. In the
early 1980s, a few courts had addressed whether surrogacy contracts were

14. “Gestational surrogacy” refers to conception via IVF, where the surrogate is unrelated
genetically to the child and “traditional surrogacy” refers to conception via artificial insemination, as in
Baby M. The surrogate is the biological mother of the child in traditional surrogacy and (usually) the
intended father is the sperm donor.
15. Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, Address at
Brasenose College, Oxford (May 11–12, 1998), in 21 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 89,
94 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 2000), available at http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/sande
100.pdf (explaining how socioeconomic inequality might lead to coercion as on objection to surrogacy).
16. Id.; see also Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women’s Labor a Commodity? 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71,
74 (1990) (arguing that when women’s capacity to carry children “is treated as a commodity, the women
who perform it are degraded”); Margaret Jane Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849,
1928–36 (1987) (analyzing surrogacy as the commodification of women’s reproductive services and of
children).
17. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 16, at 1930.
18. See, e.g., id. at 1932–34.
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enforceable,19 and in 1986 a bill regulating (but allowing) the enforcement of
these novel arrangements was under consideration in the New York
legislature.20 Surrogacy had also received some media and academic attention.21
But the Baby M case—a dramatic and emotional legal battle between a
housewife who had dropped out of high school and a couple with graduate
degrees and professional careers who sought to have a child with her
assistance—focused national attention on the issue and framed the practice as
commodification.
The outlines of the Baby M story are familiar. In February 1985, Mary Beth
Whitehead and Bill Stern executed the surrogacy contract, brokered by the
Infertility Center of New York and its director Noel Keane.22 Days after Ms.
Whitehead gave birth, she delivered the baby to the Sterns (who named her
Melissa), but she returned the next day and told them that she “could not live
without [the] baby.”23 Shortly thereafter, Ms. Whitehead and her husband took
the baby to Florida to hide out with relatives.24 After Ms. Whitehead was
apprehended and the baby returned to the Sterns, Ms. Whitehead fought Mr.
Stern’s effort to enforce the contract in a highly publicized and messy trial that
stretched over two months.25 At its end, Judge Harold Sorkow held the
surrogacy contract valid, ordering that Ms. Whitehead’s parental rights be
terminated and that Mr. Stern receive sole custody; shortly thereafter, the judge
entered an order allowing Ms. Stern’s adoption of Melissa.26

19. See, e.g., Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986) (holding that a
Kentucky statute prohibiting the sale of a child “for the purpose of adoption” does not apply to a
surrogacy contract entered into prior to conception); Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 362 N.W.2d 211 (Mich.
1985) (holding the Michigan Paternity Act, allowing the putative father of a child born out of wedlock
to seek a determination of paternity, applies when a surrogate mother is married and the biological and
intended father is married to a different woman).
20. See James Feron, Testimony Given on Surrogates’ Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1987, at A39
(describing testimony by infertile parents and surrogates favoring the bill).
21. See GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES FROM
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION TO ARTIFICIAL WOMBS 272–324 (1985) (offering a feminist critique of
surrogacy); Patricia A. Avery, Surrogate Mothers: Center of a New Storm, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
June 6, 1983, at 76.
22. Under the contract, Mr. Stern agreed to pay Ms. Whitehead $10,000 in exchange for her
agreement to be inseminated, carry any resulting pregnancy to term, deliver the baby, and relinquish it
to the Sterns, giving up her parental rights. Stern also agreed to pay $7500 to the Infertility Center of
New York. Ms. Whitehead was artificially inseminated with Mr. Stern’s sperm and delivered a baby
girl. The original birth certificate listed Ms. Whitehead and her husband as the parents of the baby. In
the Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1236 (N.J. 1988).
23. Id at 1236–37. The Sterns reported that they believed Ms. Whitehead to be so distraught as to
be suicidal, and so allowed her to keep the baby for a week. When it became apparent that Ms.
Whitehead would not relinquish the baby, Mr. Stern sought to enforce the contract. Id. at 1237.
24. Id. Ms. Whitehead fled when a New Jersey process server attempted to deliver an order to
relinquish custody. Id.
25. Margot Hornblower, Surrogate Mother Breaks Pact, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1986, at A3;
Elizabeth Kolbert, Surrogate Mother Seeks Baby, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1986, at B2.
26. In the Matter of Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128, 1175–76 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1987), rev’d in part, 537 A.2d
1227 (N.J. 1988).
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On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the lower court,
holding that the contract was unenforceable under New Jersey statutory law
and that it violated public policy.27 The court found that the contract offended
public policy because it was effectively “the sale of a child,” prohibited in this
context for the same reason that it was banned under state adoption law:
because women needing money might be coerced into giving up their children.28
Moreover, the pre-birth agreement by the mother to relinquish parental rights
was explicitly prohibited under the adoption statute.29 The Court concluded that
a surrogacy contract could never be voluntary or informed, because a woman
could not know what it would mean to give up her baby.30
***
Media coverage of the Baby M case was intense from the time the
Whiteheads fled with Melissa to Florida, and it persisted through the New
Jersey Supreme Court decision. This is not surprising. The case raised
compelling questions about the uncertain impact of a novel use of reproductive
technology on family structure, the nature of motherhood, the welfare of
children, and the role of law in this unfamiliar terrain. The story also had
powerful elements of human drama.
Over the course of the trial, reporters observed a shift in public attitudes.31
At the outset, the Sterns were viewed sympathetically as an infertile couple
eager to have a child, while Ms. Whitehead was seen as an erratic woman who
had reneged on her agreement.32 But as the trial progressed, Ms. Whitehead
increasingly was portrayed as a victim, a working-class mother who was
exploited and unfairly attacked by powerful adversaries.33 Trial narratives,
repeated in the media, may have contributed to these shifts in attitude. Some
observers were offended by the depiction of Whitehead as a bad mother by
Stern’s experts, who questioned her parenting abilities on the basis of her

27. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1240.
28. Id. at 1241 (“Our law prohibits paying or accepting money in connection with any placement of
a child for adoption.”) (citing N.J. STAT ANN. § 9:3-54 (West Supp. 1984) (repealed 1994)). The court
noted that the policy underlying this law was, in part, concern that the possibility of money for children
would make the decision “less voluntary.” Id. at 1241.
29. N.J. STAT ANN. § 9:3-41 (West 2009).
30. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1248 (opining that any decision “prior to the baby’s birth is, in the most
important sense, uninformed”).
31. Iver Peterson, Fitness Test for Baby M’s Mother Unfair, Feminists Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,
1987, at B1 (noting a “shift in public attitude” from “an initial negative perception of Ms. Whitehead as
a woman who had entered into a contract to have a baby for money and then reneged” to “a victim,
exploited by people better off than she and subjected to unfair scrutiny of her family life and
personality”).
32. Id.
33. Id.; see also James Barron, Views on Surrogacy Harden After Baby M Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
2, 1987, at A1 (examining objections to commodified surrogacy); Michael Kinsley, Baby M and the
Moral Logic of Capitalism, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1987, at 31 (noting that the Sterns’ “litigation
steamroller” and status as “upper-middle-class professionals . . . created a backlash of sympathy for the
underdog [Ms. Whitehead]”).
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lifestyle, shaky finances, and failure to provide intellectual stimulation to the
child.34 At the same time, Ms. Stern’s claim that she feared the impact of
pregnancy on her health was challenged, perhaps effectively. Harold Cassidy,
Ms. Whitehead’s attorney, described Ms. Stern to the jury as a woman who
“thought her career . . . too important to bear her own children.”35
Opposition to surrogacy arrangements and sympathy for Ms. Whitehead
were generated by a disparate group of outspoken advocates and opinion
leaders. Politicians denounced the practice; New Jersey Governor Thomas
Kean appointed a task force to study surrogacy.36 Religious leaders played an
important role, most prominently the Conference of Bishops of the Catholic
Church. This group amplified a 1987 Papal statement on reproductive
technologies arguing that surrogacy contracts were baby-selling arrangements
that undermined the family, degraded women, and harmed children.37 Childwelfare groups focused on the threat of harm to children if babies could be
exchanged for cash, and adoption advocates argued that allowing surrogacy
would erode the prohibition against purchasing babies for adoption.38
Feminists and liberals were among the most active advocates, unifying
against surrogacy as the Baby M litigation played out. Early in the trial,
feminists acknowledged that surrogacy was a hard issue; news reports described
them as “torn between support [of] a women’s right to use her body as she
chooses” and concerns about the exploitation of women.39 But feminist
columnists advocated vehemently in support of Whitehead and against

34. Peterson, supra note 31 (noting feminist objections to expert testimony questioning Ms.
Whitehead’s parenting abilities on the basis of games she played with the child, such as “patty cake”);
see also Katha Pollitt, The Strange Case of Baby M, THE NATION, May 23, 1987, at 682; infra notes 39–
42 and accompanying text.
35. Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, in CONTRACT
STORIES 127 n.118 (2007); see also Pollitt, supra note 34, at 683.
36. See Kean Tells Legislators to Look at Surrogacy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1987, at B2. Governor
Kean seemed conflicted on the issue of surrogacy; he found surrogacy arrangements “deeply, deeply
disturbing” and did not “like the idea of renting a womb,” but “to say it should be banned also goes
against my grain.” Id.
37. JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER, INSTRUCTION ON RESPECT FOR HUMAN LIFE IN ITS ORIGIN
AND THE DIGNITY OF PROCREATION: REPLIES TO CERTAIN QUESTIONS OF THE DAY (1987), http://
www.usccb.org/prolife/tdocs/donumvitae.shtml; see Church Hits Surrogacy, WASH. POST, July 16, 1987,
at A9 (reporting on objections to surrogacy contracts in an amicus curiae brief filed by Roman Catholic
bishops in the Baby M appeal); Craig R. McCoy, N.J. Bishops Decry Surrogate Parenting as
Prostitution, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 16, 1987, at B1; Roberto Suro, Vatican’s Moral Mission, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1987, at A1.
38. Child Welfare Unit Plans to Urge a Ban on Surrogacy Pacts, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1987, at A1.
39. Iver Peterson, Baby M Trial Splits Ranks of Feminists, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1987, at B1
(reporting that the membership of the New Jersey National Organization for Women split on
surrogacy); see also PHYLLIS CHESLER, SACRED BOND: THE LEGACY OF BABY M (1988) (describing
the reluctance of feminists to rally around Whitehead early in the trial); Debbie Ratterman, The Attack
on Motherhood, OFF OUR BACKS: A WOMEN’S NEWSJOURNAL, Dec. 31, 1988, at 41 (reviewing
SACRED BOND, which describes the split among feminists in their support of Whitehead).
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surrogacy, criticizing the Sterns, Judge Sorkow, and Noel Keane, the broker.40
Moreover, women’s advocates became increasingly angry at the attacks on Ms.
Whitehead by the Sterns’ lawyers and mental-health experts, believing that the
emphasis on her lifestyle and financial problems was infused with class bias and
the gender discrimination typical of child-custody disputes.41 Ms. Whitehead
was, in their view, “being held to an unfair standard of motherhood.”42
Feminists also targeted intermediaries such as Noel Keane, who charged high
fees for arranging the contracts.43 As one feminist put it, these brokers, who
exploited poor women with few options, were “the pimps of the surrogacy
movement.”44 By the time the trial concluded with a judgment upholding the
contract, feminists and women’s groups presented a united front in opposition
to surrogacy; few defended the judge’s decision. On the last day of trial
testimony, 124 prominent women released a statement supporting Ms.
Whitehead’s right to keep the child and denouncing surrogacy.45 Prominent
feminists also submitted an amicus brief to the New Jersey Supreme Court
arguing for reversal of the trial-court decision, as did the New Jersey Catholic
Congress, the Family Research Council, and the National Committee for
Adoption.46 Amicus briefs arguing for reversal of the trial-court decision greatly
outnumbered those that favored upholding the decision.47
Over the course of the Baby M litigation, advocates in the political arena
effectively framed surrogacy as illegitimate commodification. First, the
characterization of the surrogacy transaction as baby selling was invoked
repeatedly by opponents; ultimately it was adopted by the New Jersey Supreme
Court and by lawmakers in other states.48 Surrogacy, it was argued, threatened
not only the specific children who were produced through these arrangements,

40. Ellen Goodman, Surrogates Could Make Pregnancy an Industry, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1986, at
B5 (“I do not believe that anyone should be able to sign away parental rights before she has even borne
the child. A baby is not a piece of goods, and human emotions do not make for neat contracts.”);
Pollitt, supra note 34, at 681.
41. Pollitt, supra note 34, at 682.
42. Peterson, supra note 31. One expert diagnosed Ms. Whitehead as having a narcissistic
personality disorder because she dyed her hair and criticized her for offering Melissa a stuffed panda
rather than pots and pans. Id. Phyllis Chesler, a key supporter of Ms. Whitehead, made the link to the
broader issue of discrimination in child-custody disputes. See CHESLER, supra note 39, at 11, 16, 97.
43. Keane received $7500 for the Infertility Center’s services in brokering the contract. In the
Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1236 (N.J. 1988); see supra note 22.
44. See Peterson, supra note 31.
45. Id.
46. Joseph S. Sullivan, Brief by Feminists Opposes Surrogate Parenthood, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,
1987, at B3.
47. See the list of amicus curiae briefs in In the Matter of Baby M, 537 A2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
48. In the Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1249–50 (“[T]he essential evil is the same [as in the sale of
a child for adoption], taking advantage of a woman’s circumstances (the unwanted pregnancy or the
need for money) in order to take away her child . . . . There are, in civilized society, some things that
money can’t buy[;] . . . the surrogate mother’s agreement to sell her child is void.”); see also infra notes
51–54 and accompanying text (describing the use of commodification rhetoric in New York).
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but the social value of children generally.49 Second, opponents also argued that
these arrangements exploited poor women who did not understand the serious
consequences of their decisions to bear children for the benefit of wealthier,
more-powerful men.50 The intense focus on surrogacy over the course of the
trial and appeal profoundly influenced public and political opinion about these
arrangements. At the outset surrogacy contracts were unfamiliar, but were
likely viewed by most people with curiosity rather than alarm. Over time,
opposition to surrogacy grew in the political arena; the New Jersey Supreme
Court decision simply reinforced and solidified the emerging social meaning of
surrogacy as an undesirable commercial arrangement that involved the selling
of children and exploitation of women.
B. The Aftermath of Baby M
It would be hard to exaggerate the impact of Baby M on the legislative
regulation of surrogacy arrangements in the late 1980s and early 1990s. When
the case broke in 1987, no state had enacted a statute regulating surrogacy
arrangements; those that began to consider the issue in the mid-1980s were
inclined to regulate rather than to prohibit the contracts.51 But by December of
1987, even before the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Baby M, seventy bills
concerning surrogacy had been introduced in twenty-seven legislatures, and by
late 1988, six states had passed laws banning the agreements or declaring them
void—often with little opposition.52 As Baby M played out, surrogacy opponents
framed the transactions as baby-selling and exploitation of women, and
legislatures responded to advocates’ calls for restriction of the practice. Almost
all the laws passed during the post–Baby M period either prohibited the
agreements or discouraged them by disallowing payment to the surrogate or to
intermediaries or by giving surrogates the right to rescind after the birth of the
baby.53 In some states, lawmakers initiated the legislation, often with little
49. Anderson, supra note 16, at 78.
50. See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text.
51. See N.Y. ST. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., SURROGATE PARENTING IN NEW YORK: A
PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM, at 40 (1987) [hereinafter SURROGATE PARENTING IN N.Y.]
(proposing regulation of contractual surrogacy in New York and discussing the law in other states).
52. Sam O. Okpaku, The Aftereffects of the Baby M Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1988, § 12, at 26.
The Nebraska legislature voted 41–1 in favor of a bill prohibiting commercial surrogacy arrangements.
Anti-Surrogacy Bill Passes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1988, § 1, at 28; see also ‘Baby M’ Bill Passes in
Michigan, WASH. POST, June 10, 1988, at A4 (describing Michigan bill banning commercial surrogacy);
Phillip J. Hilts, N.Y. Ban Urged on Surrogate-Mother Deals, WASH. POST, May 30, 1988, at A4
(reporting that twenty states were considering banning commercial surrogacy).
53. Hilts, supra note 52. Post-Baby M statutes included: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(A)
(1989) (prohibiting commercial surrogacy contracts and granting the surrogate status as the legal
mother), invalidated by Soos v. Superior Ct. (Maricopa County), 897 P.2d 1356, 1360 (Ariz. App. 1994)
(holding that the statute violates equal protection, for “a man [can] rebut the presumption of legal
paternity by proving ‘fatherhood’ but [the statute] does not provide the same opportunity for a
woman”); IND. CODE § 31-20-1-1 (1988) (declaring surrogacy contracts unenforceable as against public
policy); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (1987) (declaring surrogacy contracts void and unenforceable as
against public policy); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 722.851–.863 (1988) (declaring surrogacy contracts void
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apparent involvement by lobbying groups.54 In other states, such as New York, a
coalition of religious groups, adoption and child-welfare advocates, and
women’s groups actively lobbied for laws that prohibited or discouraged the
practice.55
In New York, where Noel Keane’s agency had brokered the Whitehead–
Stern contract, the legislature changed course mid-stream in response to the
Baby M decision. In early 1987, a bill that had been aimed at protecting women
and children against exploitation while ensuring judicial enforcement of
surrogacy contracts that met statutory requirements was making its way quietly
through the legislature. By June, this bill was withdrawn in the face of intense
opposition from a coalition of religious organizations and women’s groups.56 A
task force created by Governor Mario Cuomo, an opponent of surrogacy,57 held
hearings dominated by surrogacy opponents. The task force issued a report that
referred frequently to Baby M and emphasized the threat posed by contracts
commodifying children and exploiting poor women.58 The report proposed
statutory reform banning surrogacy and subjecting brokers to criminal
penalties.59
Beginning in 1989, Governor Cuomo introduced legislation based on the
task-force recommendations. The legislature did not act until 1992, however,
when the New York State Department of Health published a report describing
the flourishing surrogacy market in New York.60 The report focused particularly

and unenforceable as against public policy; declaring payment for surrogacy a misdemeanor); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-21, 200 (1988) (declaring surrogacy contracts void); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 to 07 (1989) (declaring surrogacy contracts void and that surrogate is the legal mother of the resulting
child); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (1989) (granting surrogate status as the legal mother), invalidated
by J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1272 (D. Utah 2003) (a statute presuming a gestational surrogate
is the mother is unconstitutional as a burden on the fundamental right to privacy and procreation).
54. For example, the Nebraska statute passed in early 1988 on a forty-one to one vote of the
legislature, with what appears to be minimal consideration by the legislature. Anti-Surrogacy Bill
Passes, supra note 52.
55. See infra notes 64–67 and accompanying text.
56. See SURROGATE PARENTING IN N.Y., supra note 51, at 51–56 (recommending legislation
requiring judicial approval of a surrogacy contract prior to artificial insemination, suggesting means to
ensure informed consent, and setting forth a specific-performance remedy for breach); Jeffrey Schmalz,
Albany Surrogacy Bill is Withdrawn, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1987, at B2.
57. See Hilts, supra note 52.
58. In the task force hearings held in May 1987, the New York State Coalition on Women’s
Legislative Issues urged that “surrogacy contracts dehumanized women and commercialized
reproduction.” The group also argued that women could not waive their parental rights before birth
when they could not calculate the enormous physical and emotional effects of pregnancy. N.Y. STATE
TASK FORCE ON LIFE & THE LAW, SURROGATE PARENTING: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR PUBLIC POLICY 104–05 (1988) [hereinafter SURROGATE PARENTING: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY].
59. Id. at A2.
60. NEW YORK ST. DEP’T. OF HEALTH, THE BUSINESS OF SURROGATE PARENTING 1 (1992)
[hereinafter THE BUSINESS OF SURROGATE PARENTING]; see Curry, supra note 7 (describing the
importance of the Health Department report as an impetus for legislation after several unsuccessful
efforts by Governor Cuomo, beginning in 1989).
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on Noel Keane’s business and strongly advocated the passage of Cuomo’s bill.61
The legislature responded quickly, passing the law by a sizable majority in the
Assembly and near unanimity in the Senate.62
The legislative vote mirrored strong and diverse support for the bill and
widespread hostility toward surrogacy. Newspaper editorials around the state
overwhelmingly supported the legislation. (The Daily News editorial, with
characteristic hyperbole, carried the headline, “Wanna Buy a Baby?”)63 Several
state agencies endorsed the bill, including the Council on Children and Families
and the Division for Women, which argued that surrogacy “reinforces the
notion that women and children are chattels.”64 Also supporting the legislative
ban were the New York State Catholic Conference, the New York Civil
Liberties Union, and the National Council for Adoption, which described Noel
Keane’s agency as a “seedy business.”65 Finally, feminists and women’s groups
were united in support of the legislation. The New York Women’s Bar
Association and the New York chapter of NOW (the National Organization for
Women) lobbied actively for passage of the law.66 The bill was sponsored in the
Assembly by Helene Weinstein, a pro-choice Brooklyn Democrat.67

61. See THE BUSINESS OF SURROGATE PARENTING, supra note 60, at 1; see also David Bauder,
Proposal Targets Surrogate Parenting, THE TIMES UNION (Albany), May 13, 1992, at B10.
62. N.Y. Counsel to the Governor, 12590 Legislative Bill & Veto Jacket, ch. 308, at 2 (1992)
[hereinafter Legislative Bill & Veto Jacket] (on file with Law and Contemporary Problems) (reporting
the results of the Senate vote on the bill, 59–0, and the General Assembly vote, 104–39).
63. Editorial, Ban Commercial Surrogacy, BUFF. NEWS, June 11, 1989; Editorial, It’s Baby-Selling
and It’s Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1988, at A26; Editorial, Wanna Buy a Baby?, DAILY NEWS, May
19, 1992; Editorial, Womb to Rent, NEWSDAY, June 8, 1992, at 32.
64. Memorandum from Paulette Taylor, General Counsel, State of New York Division for
Women, to Elizabeth Moore, Counsel to the Governor (July 9, 1992), Legislative Bill & Veto Jacket,
supra note 62, at 25; Memorandum from Frederick B. Meservy, Acting Executive Director, State of
New York Council on Children and Families to Elizabeth Moore, Counsel to the Governor (July 8,
1992), Legislative Bill & Veto Jacket, supra note 62, at 24.
65. Memorandum from New York Civil Liberties Union to Elizabeth Moore, Counsel to the
Governor (1992), Legislative Bill & Veto Jacket, supra note 62 at 28–29; Letter from William Pierce,
President, National Council for Adoption, to Christopher J. Mega, Chair, Senate Judiciary Committee
(May 22, 1992), Legislative Bill & Veto Jacket, supra note 62, at 41. John M. Kerry of the Catholic
Conference suggested that a child born of a surrogacy arrangement would “grow up with the horrifying
realization that his real mother conceived him in order to sell him.” Letter from John M. Kerry,
Executive Director of the New York State Catholic Conference, to Elizabeth Moore, Counsel to the
Governor (June 30, 1992), Legislative Bill & Veto Jacket, supra note 62, at 94–95.
66. Letter & Memorandum from Joan Leary Matthews, Co-Chair, Women’s Bar Association of
the State of New York, to Mario M. Cuomo, Governor of the State of New York (July 9, 1992),
Legislative Bill & Veto Jacket, supra note 62, at 32–36; Memorandum from Marilyn Pitterman,
President; Lois Shapiro-Canter, Lobbyist; and Simone Charlton, Legislative Vice President, New York
State National Organization for Women, to Elizabeth Moore, Counsel to the Governor (May 26, 1992),
Legislative Bill & Veto Jacket, supra note 62, at 62. The NOW memorandum described surrogacy as
threatening the “potential erosion of parental, reproductive, and privacy rights of women.”
67. Letter from G. Oliver Koppell, Member of Assembly, to Mario M. Cuomo, Governor of the
State of New York (July 2, 1992), Legislative Bill & Veto Jacket, supra note 62, at 15 (noting
Weinstein’s sponsorship of the bill).
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Opposition was muted. A few legislators argued that the bill was far too
restrictive and that reasonable regulation could diminish the relatively modest
risks posed by surrogacy arrangements.68 Beyond this, opposition to the
proposed law was not organized, coming from a few surrogate mothers and
from infertile couples, some of whom had acquired children through
surrogacy.69 Interestingly, brokers seem to have participated little in the
legislative process, including Noel Keane, whose business was the target of
much criticism.70
The 1992 passage of the New York statute represents the political highwater mark of the antisurrogacy movement. Enthusiastic supporters of the bill
hoped that surrogacy would soon die out as other states followed New York’s
lead in prohibiting the agreements.71 But this did not happen. Political and
media interest in surrogacy dwindled, and by the mid-1990s, little legislative
activity focused on this issue. In some states, bills prohibiting surrogacy died
without action. For example, in 1993, legislative sponsors in New Jersey
proposed a bill similar to the New York statute, based on the recommendations
of the task force appointed by Governor Thomas Kean, which had studied
surrogacy exhaustively for four years.72 The bill generated little interest or
support and it was withdrawn in 1994, never to be reintroduced.73
C. Toward a New Model of Surrogacy Regulation
Contrary to predictions, surrogacy has flourished over the past decade and
attitudes toward these arrangements have mellowed considerably in the
political arena, despite restrictive laws in such key states as New York.
Legislatures in several states have established procedures and requirements for
68. Id. (letter opposing bill). Koppell pointed out that the Health Department report, THE
BUSINESS OF SURROGATE PARENTING, supra note 60, found only three cases involving serious
problems. Id.
69. Parent’s letters described their joy in their children and warm relationships with surrogates. See
letters collected in Legislative Bill & Veto Jacket, supra note 62; see also Curry, supra note 7
(describing “no organized opposition”).
70. In an interview, Noel Keane even appeared to endorse allowing courts to decide custody if the
surrogate backs out. Catherine Clabby, Surrogate Moms on the Way Out? New Law Prohibits
Pregnancy Profits, THE TIMES UNION (Albany), July 26, 1992, at 1 (quoting Keane regarding waiting
periods: “If [a surrogate] changes her mind in a 20- to 30-day period, you could award custody by the
courts based on the best interests of the child.”). Only Betsy Aigen, owner of a small surrogacy agency,
opposed the bill. Letter from Dr. Betsy Aigen to Elizabeth Moore, Counsel to the Governor,
Legislative Bill & Veto Jacket, supra note 62, at 53–61.
71. See, e.g., Antisurrogacy Laws Gain Ground on “Baby Sellers,” Challengers Say Last Hopes Are
Worth a Fight, BALTIMORE SUN, July 28, 1992, at 4A (expressing hope that the law would eliminate the
practice). This hope may have seemed quite realistic in that forty percent of the surrogacy
arrangements in the country were brokered in New York. See Clabby, supra note 70.
72. See N.J. COMM. ON LEGAL & ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE,
AFTER BABY M: THE LEGAL, ETHICAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF SURROGACY (1992)
[hereinafter AFTER BABY M] (findings of the New Jersey Task Force regarding surrogacy and
proposed reform).
73. Randy Diamond, Assembly Baby Broker Bill Goes Nowhere, THE RECORD (New Jersey), Mar.
16, 1994, at A5.
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enforcing surrogacy contracts, while in other states, courts have upheld the
agreements.74 A survey of these lawmaking activities and of recent media
coverage suggests that surrogacy has assumed a new social meaning. Today the
issue is seldom framed as baby selling and exploitation; instead, the discourse
emphasizes the service provided by surrogates to couples who otherwise could
not have genetically related children.75 Moreover, the legislative goal of
discouraging and punishing a pernicious practice largely has been replaced by
the pragmatic objective of providing certainty about parental status and
protecting all participants, especially children.76
Two factors stand out in the account of these legal developments. First, with
improvements in IVF, gestational surrogacy, in which a pre-embryo is
implanted in the surrogate, has largely replaced traditional surrogacy, in which
the pregnancy results from artificial insemination of the surrogate’s own egg.
Gestational surrogacy has proven to be more attractive to the parties and more
palatable to lawmakers and the public.77 Second, the constellation of interest
groups lobbying to shape legislation in recent years has changed dramatically.
Attorneys, brokers, and parents’ groups have become active advocates for
supportive laws, while women’s groups and civil-liberties organizations have
withdrawn from the political arena. Today only religious groups and social
conservatives lobby actively against facilitative regulation.78
1. The Rise of Gestational Surrogacy: Calvert v. Johnson
In the wave of legislation that followed Baby M, little attention was directed
toward the distinction between traditional and gestational surrogacy. This may
not be surprising, in that Baby M herself was the product of traditional
surrogacy, and gestational surrogacy was not common in the 1980s.79 Most
statutes enacted in the late 1980s and early 1990s applied generically to all
surrogacy contracts, as did the ABA Model Act and the Uniform Act.80
This generic response began to change with Calvert v. Johnson, a 1993
California Supreme Court decision involving a baby who was the genetic child

74. See, e.g., the Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/1-75 (2006); see also
cases cited supra note 11.
75. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 9.
76. This response is evident in statements by legislators in Illinois and other states, see infra note
88, and by courts, authorizing intended parents to be named on the birth certificate, even without
statutory authorization, see cases cited supra note 11.
77. See infra notes 81–87 and accompanying text.
78. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
79. Louise Brown was the first child born by IVF in 1978. Thus, gestational surrogacy was
relatively new in the 1980s. The use of IVF increased dramatically from the mid-1980s through 2002.
DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE AND POLITICS DRIVE THE
COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 24, 32 (2006).
80. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT (1988); A.B.A’s 2 Models for
‘Baby M’ Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1989, at C13 (noting that the 1989 ABA Model Surrogacy Act
offered two alternatives—a ban on enforcement of contracts providing financial compensation to a
surrogate, and a statute authorizing but regulating surrogacy).
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of both intended parents.81 The court rejected the parental claim of the
gestational surrogate (Johnson), holding that the intended mother (Calvert)
was the child’s legal mother. The court found that Johnson and Calvert had
both produced “acceptable proof of maternity” under California’s parentage
statute—Johnson on the basis of pregnancy and birth, and Calvert on the basis
of genetics—distinguishing the case from the traditional arrangement in which
the surrogate was both the genetic and the gestational parent. The court held
that, in this situation, parental status should be determined on the basis of the
parties’ intentions as expressed in the surrogacy contract. Rejecting Johnson’s
argument that the surrogate had a “constitutionally protected liberty interest in
the companionship of the child, based on her status as the ‘birth mother,’” the
court concluded that, as a surrogate, Johnson was not exercising procreative
choice, but was providing a service.82
Calvert generated surprisingly little controversy,83 but the case had a
profound impact on surrogacy practice. Gestational surrogacy quickly became
the preferred arrangement.84 Within a relatively brief period, many states went
beyond Calvert, recognizing the parental status of intended mothers when a
donated egg was used and neither the surrogate nor the intended mother was
the child’s genetic mother.85 Gestational surrogacy arrangements became
standard, in part because they offered legal certainty about the parental status
of all parties to the surrogacy contract, and also because improvements in
reproductive technology made pregnancy outcomes in IVF more predictable
and thus less costly than in its early years.86
The difference between gestational- and traditional-surrogacy contracts has
become an important legal distinction. In the absence of statutory authority,
numerous courts have directed that intended parents, and not the surrogate, be
named on the birth certificate in gestational arrangements.87 Moreover, the new
Uniform Parentage Act and most of the surrogacy statutes enacted since 2000
81. 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993). Ms. Calvert, the intended mother, could not become pregnant
because of a hysterectomy.
82. Id. at 787. The court distinguished between the constitutional protections granted to a woman
who chooses to bear her own child and a woman who enters a contractual surrogacy agreement. Id.
83. Katha Pollitt was unusual in her scathing denunciation of the Calvert decision. Katha Pollitt,
When is a Mother Not a Mother?, THE NATION, Dec. 31, 1990, at 839, 842 (“[The decision] defines, or
redefines, maternity in a way that is thoroughly degrading to women.”).
84. See Sanger, supra note 35, at 140.
85. See cases cited supra note 11.
86. SPAR, supra note 79, at 28–30. In 1985, IVF produced a child about 10–15% of the time; by
2002, the odds had risen to 30–35% for women under age 35. Id. at 28, 55.
87. See cases cited supra note 11. When all parties are in agreement, courts have struck down state
statutes prohibiting such agreements. For example, one appellate court held a statute making the
surrogate the child’s legal mother to be unconstitutional when applied to disputes between the intended
parents when the intended mother was also the biological parent. Soos v. Super. Ct., 897 P.2d 1356,
1361 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (striking down statute on equal-protection grounds for treating genetic
mother and father differently); see also J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D. Utah 2003) (holding Utah
statute unconstitutional that prohibited putting the genetic parent’s names on the birth certificate and
that automatically granted the gestational surrogate status as the legal mother).
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deal exclusively with requirements for enforcement of gestational-surrogacy
agreements, leaving traditional arrangements in a legal void.88
2. Statutory Reform: The Second Wave of Surrogacy Laws
The recent statutory reforms in surrogacy law have been driven largely by
pragmatic concerns. As couples eager to have children have increasingly shown
themselves ready to turn to surrogates, even when the agreements are of
uncertain legality, lawmakers have recognized the potential harms posed by the
lack of regulation. In a legal vacuum, and even when surrogacy contracts are
prohibited, a host of legal problems can arise regarding the rights and
obligations of the participants toward the child. Along with the risk of
acrimonious custody litigation between the surrogate and the intended parents,
costly uncertainty can result when the intended parents divorce or decline to
accept the child, perhaps because the baby is born with a medical condition or
disability. Against this background, many lawmakers concluded that because
surrogacy arrangements would continue with or without facilitating legislation,
the appropriate legal response was to establish rules under which parental
status was clearly prescribed.89
The Illinois legislation is representative. In 2003, the Illinois Supreme Court
implored the legislature to safeguard the interests of children born as a result of
assisted reproduction by clarifying the parental status of the involved adults.90
The legislature responded in 2004 by passing the Gestational Surrogacy Act
(GSA). Like other contemporary laws, this statute limits enforcement to
gestational (and not traditional) surrogacy contracts and mandates that the
intended parents automatically become the child’s legal parents at birth.91 Also
like other contemporary statutes, the GSA restricts enforcement to
arrangements in which the surrogate has given birth before and the intended
parents have a medical need for the surrogacy.92 But the Illinois law creates a
more efficient (and less expensive) process than other states by providing a prebirth registration process rather than a judicial proceeding to establish the
status of the intended parents.93

88. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 299 (2000) (referring only to gestational surrogacy); 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/25 (2006); FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (2008) (referring only to gestational surrogacy);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.045 (2008) (requiring “an egg and sperm from the intended parents”). Some
states authorize enforcement without distinguishing between gestational and traditional agreements.
E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-159 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. §§ 168-B:1 to -B:32 (2008).
89. For example, in 2000, the Uniform Parentage Act provision offering states the option of
declaring surrogacy agreements void was repealed, on the ground that regulation was essential because
parties would continue to enter these agreements. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801, 9B U.L.A. 362
cmt. (2000); see also In re Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144 (Ill. 2003).
90. In re M.J., 787 N.E.2d at 150 (emphasizing that the Illinois Parentage Act, enacted in 1975, did
not contemplate the new reproductive technologies).
91. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/15 (2006); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 299 (2000).
92. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20(a)(2), 20(b)(2) (2006).
93. The statute also directs that parentage be determined by a judicial proceeding on the basis of
the parties’ intent if the parties fail to meet statutory requirements. 47/25(e). Further, it allows contract
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An account of the 2004 legislative process in Illinois illustrates how much
the legal and political landscape had changed since the days of Baby M. No
reports indicate that the bill was challenged as promoting baby selling or that it
was criticized for being exploitative of women who served as surrogates.
Indeed, one is hard-pressed to find opposition to the proposed Illinois law.94
Advocating for the bill were parents’ groups, the Illinois State Bar Association,
and attorneys who practiced in the area of adoption and assisted reproduction.95
News coverage was also positive, with reports of warm relationships between
surrogates and grateful couples, and explanations of how the new law would
avoid the “horror stories” in which surrogates or intended parents backed out
of agreements.96 The bill was passed without opposition in both houses of the
legislature.97
Despite the equanimity with which the GSA was enacted in Illinois,
opposition to surrogacy arrangements continues in some quarters. In 2008, the
Minnesota legislature passed a bill almost identical to the Illinois statute, but in
the face of stiff opposition from social and religious conservatives, including
several anti-abortion groups.98 The Catholic Church criticized the bill in
measured terms, but the Minnesota Family Council called the legislation
“legalized baby-selling” and charged the statute with promoting single-parent
and same-sex-parent households.99 Lobbying in favor of the bill were the
Minnesota State Bar Association and Resolve, an increasingly active
organization of adults dealing with infertility problems.100 The legislature voted
almost 2–1 in favor of the bill—which was then vetoed by Republican Governor
Tim Pawlenty.101 As in Illinois, no evidence indicates that any women’s

terms regulating the surrogate’s behavior in matters that may affect the health of the fetus, including
compliance with medical advice and abstention from alcohol, tobacco, and nonprescription drugs.
47/25(d).
94. Nidhi Desai, an attorney intimately involved in drafting and proposing the bill, reports that few
opponents—and no women’s groups—spoke against it. According to Desai, who testified in support of
the bill, “the members [legislators] had a lot of questions, and they were satisfied with the answers.”
Telephone Interview with Nidhi Desai, in Chicago, Ill. (July 9, 2008).
95. Id.
96. See Graham, supra note 2 (quoting the bill’s House sponsor: “The idea was to clarify who has
responsibility for the child born through this process,” and to avoid litigation); see also Rogers, supra
note 9.
97. H.R. Roll Call, H.B. 4962, 93rd Gen. Assem., Third Reading (Ill. 2004) (vote recorded 113–0);
S. Vote, H.B. 4962, 93rd Gen. Assem., Third Reading (Ill. 2004) (vote recorded 53–0).
98. Mike Kaszuba, Group Says Surrogacy Bill Allows for Baby-Selling, MINN. STAR TRIB., Apr. 9,
2008, at 5B.
99. Id.
100. See RESOLVE: The National Infertility Association, http://www.resolve.org (last visited Feb.
1, 2009); see also T.W. Budig, Surrogacy Legislation Fills a Void, Supporters Say, ISANTI COUNTY
NEWS, Mar. 13, 2008, available at http://isanticountynews.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=
view&id=2942&Itemid=59 (describing political opposition to and support of the Minnesota bill).
101. Andy Birkey, Surrogacy Bill Passes Minnesota Legislature, REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH,
May 19, 2008, http://www.rhrealitycheck.org/blog/2008/05/16/surrogacy-bill-passes-minnesota-legislature;
Governor Tim Pawlenty, Letter to James P. Metzen Vetoing the 2008 Surrogacy Gestational Bill, S. 85-
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organizations or civil-liberties groups participated in the legislative process in
Minnesota.
The history of surrogacy regulation over the past twenty years presents
several puzzles. How did one case generate such intense hostility and alarm
about an arrangement that had attracted little attention until that time?
Women’s groups and social conservatives seldom ally on matters of
reproductive choice. How did that alliance form and why was it so short-lived?
And what are the forces that altered the social meaning and political dynamic of
surrogacy in a relatively short period? The discussion that follows is intended to
unravel these puzzles and to shed some light on the social and political framing
and reframing of surrogacy.
III
THE BABY M ERA: MORAL PANIC AND INTEREST-GROUP POLITICS
The intense interest in surrogacy triggered by the Baby M decision shaped
the law in ways that have had a lasting impact in many states. This response had
the flavor of a moral panic that became institutionalized through legislation.
Because of the drama and salience of the case and the novelty of surrogacy, the
contracts came to be perceived as a serious threat to core social values, a
perception that was reinforced by political actors and the media. The framing of
surrogacy as commodification was shaped and promoted by feminists and
religious leaders who amplified its social meaning as baby-selling and the
exploitation of women. These groups were driven by different ideological and
political goals, but they forged an effective political alliance that played an
important role in shaping the law for years to come.
A. Why a Moral Panic?
Sociologists have long been interested in moral panics, a form of collective
action in which the public, the media, and political actors reinforce each other
in an escalating pattern of intense and disproportionate concern in response to
a perceived social threat.102 Moral panics are often triggered by highly publicized
events that engender public alarm.103 Typically, hostile attention is focused on a
particular group of individuals who are deemed responsible for the threat and
who, it is felt, must be stopped.104 A moral panic is distinguished from a
straightforward effort to deal with a pressing social problem by the gap between
perception of the threat and reality.105 In a moral panic, participants exaggerate
2965, 117th Day, at 10378–79 (Minn. 2008), available at http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/journals/20072008/20080516117.pdf#Page67.
102. Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda authored the authoritative analysis of moral panics.
ERICH GOODE & NACHMAN BEN-YEHUDA, MORAL PANICS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
DEVIANCE (1994).
103. Id. at 82.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 31.
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the seriousness of the threat and the urgency of the need for government action
in response.106
On first inspection, the response to Baby M and the opposition to surrogacy
arrangements that was generated by the case seem somewhat different from the
classic moral panic. Unlike a school shooting that triggers outraged calls for a
crackdown on juvenile crime, surrogacy did not inherently represent a social
evil. Conceivably, during the course of the trial, surrogacy could have taken on
the more-benign social meaning that it has assumed in recent years. But this did
not happen. The meaning of surrogacy as baby selling and exploitation of poor
women crystallized; accordingly, public and political concern about the threat of
social harm intensified, along with demands for official attention.
One source of the moral panic surrounding Baby M was an understandable
(and legitimate, under the circumstances) unease about the new reproductive
technologies emerging in the 1980s. Although traditional surrogacy of the
Whitehead–Stern variety was quite low-tech, it was associated in public
discourse with IVF and cloning—unfamiliar and sophisticated technological
developments.107 Less than a decade after the birth of Louise Brown, the first
child conceived through IVF, American society had only begun to contemplate
the dramatic changes in family formation made possible by technologies that
allowed genetic, gestational, and social parenting to be disaggregated.108
Thoughtful people had concerns about these scientific developments that
seemed to pose a threat to core social values and these concerns likely
contributed to the framing of surrogacy as commodification.109 Scientific
innovation raised the possibility of breeding farms and markets in designer
babies.110 Thus, some of the negative response to Baby M was driven by anxiety
about the unfamiliar and uncertain risks associated with surrogacy and with the
new reproductive technologies generally.111 The unhappy outcome of the
Whitehead–Stern arrangement simply reinforced a general concern that the
“brave new world” of assisted reproduction was a perilous one.
Although grounded in legitimate concerns, the response to Baby M in the
political arena was typical of the way a dynamic interplay among political
actors, the media, and the public can create and sustain a moral panic. The
106. Id. at 26, 120.
107. See SPAR, supra note 79, at 70.
108. Id. at 24, 26–30 (explaining the birth and growth of the “baby market” and discussing Louise
Brown).
109. See generally supra notes 15–16 (describing philosophical arguments against surrogacy).
110. For a gripping fictional account, see MARGARET ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID’S TALE (1985),
describing a futuristic, patriarchal society where the only role of women is to submissively reproduce
(although not through reproductive technologies). See generally COREA, supra note 21.
111. Both the New York and New Jersey task force reports linked Baby M to social and ethical
issues raised by new reproductive technologies. See AFTER BABY M, supra note 72, at 1 (New Jersey
report); SURROGATE PARENTING: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY, supra
note 58, at 1–2 (New York report). Unfamiliar risks often appear to be more threatening than familiar
risks. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV.
683, 783 (1999).
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media played a key role in maintaining public attention—the troubling story of
the fight over the child was in the news for more than a year. The story was
compelling in itself, but it also intensified media and public interest in the
broader issues surrounding surrogacy, and discussions of the broader issues
were often linked to the case. In this way, Baby M fueled political and public
concern as it came to represent the risks posed generally by surrogacy
arrangements—and perhaps by uses of other novel reproductive technologies as
well.
Cognitive psychologists have clarified the mechanisms through which a
moral panic is generated and sustained by showing how attention directed at a
particular threat affects individuals’ perceptions about the magnitude of the
danger.112 Individuals use heuristics, or rules of thumb, to process information
and assess the importance of particular data; these short-cuts are very useful but
can lead to systematic biases.113 One such cognitive short-cut, the availability
heuristic, leads us to overvalue vivid experiential data that can be readily
brought to mind and to discount the importance of abstract information.114 Thus
we are likely to judge a readily imaginable event to be more risky than one that
is remote or not easily contemplated.115 The Baby M story was not
representative of typical surrogacy arrangements, but it is easy to see how the
intense media coverage of the acrimonious dispute might have assumed
disproportionate salience to a person evaluating the social harm of surrogacy, as
compared to the abstract evidence that most surrogacy arrangements were
carried out smoothly. Opponents of surrogacy focused on Baby M and a few
other stories involving unhappy outcomes to underscore the substantial threat
of harm to children and women posed by these arrangements.116
Assessments of risk that fuel a moral panic are not simply a matter of
individual misperceptions. Public concern about the seriousness of a social
problem is magnified when the threat is repeated and reinforced in public
discourse, for each re-telling makes the threat more salient. Scholars have called
this dynamic process an “availability cascade.”117 In the case of surrogacy,
politicians and other opinion leaders generated and reinforced public interest
and alarm, using Baby M to frame the issue. Governors Kean and Cuomo, for
example, spoke out against surrogacy and established task forces in their

112. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, &
Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 3, 11.
115. Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff & Sarah Lichtenstein, Fact Versus Fears: Understanding
Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 112, at
465.
116. Another case frequently cited involved intended parents who allegedly refused to take twin
babies, insisting that they had only agreed to take one child. THE BUSINESS OF SURROGATE
PARENTING, supra note 61, at 8.
117. See generally Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 111.
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states.118 Feminists, women’s groups, and religious organizations (especially the
Catholic Church) stimulated support for Ms. Whitehead and momentum for
antisurrogacy law reform through courthouse vigils, interviews, petitions,
newspaper columns, amicus briefs and legislative testimony.119 Ultimately,
opponents successfully shaped the social meaning of surrogacy as a degrading
business in which poor women were unfairly exploited and coerced by profitseeking brokers to sell their babies. This attention by opinion leaders was fed by
the media, which, perceiving the public’s interest, continued to give the issue
substantial coverage; editorial opinion, tracking the attitude of civic and social
leaders, was almost uniformly hostile to surrogacy and favorable to restriction.120
Through this process, a powerful narrative defining surrogacy as
commodification was created and sustained, and the view that “something must
be done” by the government to respond to the threat was translated into law
reform in several states.
Although advocates identified the primary evil of surrogacy as baby selling,
neither the sellers nor the buyers were cast as the villains of the moral panic
triggered by Baby M. Instead, opponents targeted the broker intermediaries as
the evil-doers who must be stopped. Commercial surrogacy was seen as a
business venture, operated with the goal of making a profit through the
exploitation of poor women and childless couples.121 Noel Keane, whose
surrogacy agency was the largest and best-known, was frequently depicted as
the typical broker—an unsavory opportunist who had grown rich in the babyselling business.122 In New York, for example, the Health Department report
that pointed to the threat posed by Keane and his ilk was the key to mobilizing
a previously reluctant legislature to pass a strict prohibition with criminal
sanctions for intermediaries.123
That other participants in surrogacy arrangements were viewed as less
culpable is not surprising. Surrogates themselves were depicted sympathetically;
118. Both advocated for restrictive legislation and played key roles in the political process.
Beginning in 1989, Governor Cuomo introduced a bill banning surrogacy in each legislative session
until it was passed in 1992. See sources cited, supra note 60.
119. Feminist activism against surrogacy is described supra notes 39–46 and accompanying text.
Phyllis Chessler played a key role as an opinion leader in mobilizing feminist support. In her book,
Sacred Bond, she describes the roles of various individuals and groups in building support for Ms.
Whitehead and opposition to surrogacy. CHESLER, supra note 39, at 71–107. Catholic opposition to
surrogacy is described supra note 37 and accompanying text.
120. See Editorial, Nothing Surrogate About the Pain, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1987, at A14; see also
editorials favoring the New York statute cited supra note 63.
121. See, e.g., infra note 146 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., id. The New Jersey task force reported that only fourteen agencies existed, of which
only six had arranged forty or more surrogacies. AFTER BABY M, supra note 72, at 39. Keane operated
the only sizable agency arranging surrogacy contracts during this period, suggesting the extent to which
the threat of surrogacy was exaggerated in the midst of the moral panic surrounding Baby M. THE
BUSINESS OF SURROGATE PARENTING, supra note 61, at 3–8. For an informative description of Keane
and his role, see Sanger, supra note 35, at 144–49.
123. See Curry, supra note 7 (describing the importance of the Health department report as a
catalyst for the legislation).

06_SCOTT_BOOK PROOF.DOC

Summer 2009] SURROGACY AND THE POLITICS OF COMMODIFICATION

11/9/2009 1:22:51 PM

129

their decisions to become involved in the reprehensible arrangements were seen
as coerced by circumstances (and by the brokers) and as ill-informed about the
consequences. Infertile couples seeking to acquire children fared somewhat less
well. Surrogacy opponents criticized the Sterns for participating in the
exploitation of Ms. Whitehead, characterizing them as rich people using their
superior wealth and social status to indulge their desire for a genetically linked
child.124 Critics expressed skepticism about Ms. Stern’s claimed medical
disability, ridiculing her as a woman who put her career first and found child
bearing inconvenient.125 But, despite these disparaging attacks on the Sterns, the
vilification of infertile couples seeking to have children through surrogacy
arrangements did not seem to stick. Most observers likely had some sympathy
for their plight, seeing the desire to have a child with a biological connection to
one parent as a natural and understandable, if wrongheaded, impulse.126 Thus, in
the political arena and in the media, brokers were the villains and parties to
surrogacy arrangements, on the whole, were described sympathetically.
B. The Activists for Law Reform: An Unlikely Coalition
At one level, the legislative reform following Baby M is a straightforward
story of interest-group politics. In New York, for example, several wellorganized constituencies joined to lobby for the ban on commercial surrogacy,
while opposition to the bill was weak and not well organized.127 But the coalition
was a curious one: feminists and civil-liberties groups seldom ally with
traditional religious organizations—particularly on issues relating to the
regulation of reproductive choices. For the Catholic Church and other social
conservatives, political opposition to surrogacy was compatible with broader
family-policy agendas. This was less clear for civil libertarians, feminists, and
women’s groups, whose stance on surrogacy seemed to be in tension with their
commitment to women’s reproductive autonomy—as some feminists recognized
at the outset.128 Two questions should be addressed: What explains the
antisurrogacy position taken by feminists and civil-liberties groups? And what
explains the lack of dissent within these groups in the political arena—given the
early recognition that the issue was a hard one for feminists?

124. Pollitt, supra note 34, at 682.
125. Id. (“[W]e never found out why Dr. Elizabeth Stern claimed to be infertile on her application . .
. or why she didn’t confirm that diagnosis until shortly before the case went to trial, much less consult a
specialist in the management of MS pregnancies.”); Sanger, supra note 35, at 153–54 (“Bill and Betsy
had never tried to conceive a child together . . . .”).
126. AFTER BABY M, supra note 72, at 13–14 (describing infertility data, causes, and prevention);
SURROGATE PARENTING: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 58,
at 7–13 (same).
127. See supra notes 68–70. The legislative packet includes many letters from organizations
supporting the statute and only a handful, mostly from individuals, opposed. See Legislative Bill &
Veto Jacket, supra note 62.
128. See Peterson, supra note 31; Peterson, supra note 39.
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1. Conservative Opposition to Surrogacy
The Catholic Church opposed surrogacy arrangements and supported legal
prohibition even before Baby M captured national attention. Surrogacy was
simply one dimension of a larger threat to core Catholic beliefs about family
formation posed by new reproductive technologies. In 1987, while Baby M was
in the headlines but not yet decided, the Vatican issued a forceful statement
condemning surrogacy and explaining that all means of assisted reproduction
were prohibited under Church doctrine, which requires that children be created
only through the conjugal union of husband and wife.129 This pronouncement,
the product of several years of study, specifically called on governments to
prohibit surrogacy; it was immediately linked to Baby M in news accounts.130 For
the Church, Baby M provided an opportunity to influence lawmaking on a
matter of grave moral and doctrinal importance, and the Church’s active efforts
to frame surrogacy as commodification and to influence its regulation rested on
this religious foundation.131
More generally, opposition to surrogacy arrangements was (and is)
compatible with the family-values agenda of religious and social conservatives.
Indeed, the views of pro-life activists about abortion and motherhood also
illuminate their hostility to surrogacy arrangements. In her important study of
abortion activists, Kristin Luker found that many abortion opponents were
women who saw sexuality, pregnancy, and motherhood within traditional
marriage as the essential core of women’s identity.132 These women viewed prochoice advocates as careerists whose efforts to control fertility undermined the
family and devalued women’s most important role.133 It is easy to see how these
attitudes might translate into hostility toward surrogacy and toward career
women like Ms. Stern. For religious and social conservatives, surrogacy
arrangements represented a threat to the traditional family and to women’s
roles as wives and mothers, whereas Ms. Whitehead’s urgent desire to keep her
child was a “natural mother’s instinct” that should be respected.134

129. Ratzinger, supra note 37. The statement, authored by Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger (the current
Pope Benedict XVI) was initiated in the early 1980s by Pope John Paul II, out of concern that new
reproductive technologies were inconsistent with traditional religious norms. See also Bernard Lo,
Vatican Statement on Life Is a Start, Not an Answer, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1987, at 5 (describing the
Church’s statement); Roberto Suro, Vatican’s Moral Mission, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1987, at A1 (“[The
Vatican’s statement] exploits what some church officials consider an unparalleled opportunity to
influence governments before they enact laws on controversial medical innovations.”).
130. See, e.g., Church Hits Surrogacy, supra note 37.
131. An amicus curiae brief submitted to the New Jersey Supreme Court in Baby M by the New
Jersey Catholic Conference stated that surrogacy is “a new form of prostitution, . . . traffic[king] for
profit in human lives,” degrading women, and “dehumaniz[ing] children.” Craig McCoy, N.J. Bishops
Decry Surrogate Parenting as Prostitution, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 16, 1987, at B1.
132. See generally KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 194–208
(1984).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 160.
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2. Opposition to Surrogacy by Women’s Advocates
This account of the motivation of conservative opponents of surrogacy does
little to illuminate the response of most feminists. A core part of the feminist
political agenda has been vigilant resistance to the notion that the government,
and not women themselves, should control reproductive decisions. One might
have expected that some pro-choice advocates would support allowing women
to make their own decisions about entering surrogacy arrangements. And in
fact, early in the Baby M trial, some feminists expressed reservations about the
political agenda of those supporting Ms. Whitehead, arguing that paternalistic
restrictions on surrogacy contracts were dangerous incursions into women’s
procreative freedom.135 But advocates with this view ultimately played little role
in the political process.
The prevailing feminist position opposing surrogacy was compatible, to an
extent, with core feminist commitments to gender equality and control over
reproduction, and with a general concern that women not be defined by their
reproductive capacity. First, for many feminists, surrogacy represented yet
another context in which women were valued primarily for their sexual and
reproductive capacities rather than for their intellect and skills. One feminist
compared the surrogate to “human potting soil for the man’s seed.”136 To her
(and to others), the practice of surrogacy was designed to satisfy men’s desire
for children—or for profit, in the case of brokers like Noel Keane—and the
arrangements relegated women to the low-status job of “baby maker.”137
Moreover, many feminists implicitly framed the issue of control over
reproduction by focusing not on the decision to enter the surrogacy contract,
but on the decision to relinquish the child.138 In this view, the woman’s
reproductive choice was not to act as a surrogate, but to keep the baby, a
decision that powerful men (such as Mr. Stern, Mr. Keane, and Judge Sorkow)
were seeking to override. For these feminists, it was troubling that the bond
between a mother and her child that developed during pregnancy could be

135. E.g., Lorraine Sorrel, Baby M Again, OFF OUR BACKS: A WOMEN’S NEWSJOURNAL, July 31,
1987, at 26. Sorrel argued that Ms. Whitehead should be held to her contract or else women’s abilities
to make reproductive decisions would be threatened and motherhood would be unduly sanctified so
women could not assume other roles. Opponents of surrogacy and supporters of Ms. Whitehead noted
the reluctance of feminists to get on board. E.g., CHESLER, supra note 39, at 22, 34 (noting feminist
claims that a woman should have the right to control the use of her body, and arguments that
“patriarchal motherhood” has taken away the sanctity of biological reproduction); Pollitt, supra note
34, at 685 (“Some women argue that to allow Ms. Whitehead to back out of her pledge would be to
stigmatize all women as irrational and incapable of adulthood under the law.”). A few feminist legal
scholars also argued for enforcement of surrogacy contracts. See, e.g., Lori Andrews, Surrogate
Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists, 16 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 72, 78 (1988) (arguing that it
is sexist and classist to assume that poor women cannot make educated reproductive choices).
136. Pollitt, supra note 34, at 688.
137. Id. at 687–88.
138. See e.g., Katherine Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L. J. 293, 333–34 (1988); Vicki
C. Jackson, Baby M and the Question of Parenthood, 76 GEO. L. J. 1811, 1818–20 (1988).
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severed coercively on the basis of a contract.139 In general, for feminists who
focused on the mother–child relationship as a core concern of feminism, the
threat to this bond posed by surrogacy contracts was of primary importance.140
These arguments against surrogacy reflected genuine feminist concerns, but
they rested, at least in part, on an assumption that decisions by women to enter
surrogacy contracts were not autonomous choices that should be enforced. As a
general proposition, most feminists presume that women are capable of
assessing their own interests and making decisions in pursuit of their goals. One
could imagine a narrative in which a woman decides that, in entering a
surrogacy contract, she will be performing a useful service for the intended
parents while furthering her own interests and those of her family—by earning
money while caring for her children at home, for example.141 In this narrative,
surrogates are rational, self-interested actors—and should be held to their
promises upon which others rely. Feminists opposing surrogacy implicitly
rejected such a narrative because they believed that some dimensions of a
surrogate’s decisionmaking process were seriously flawed.142
Feminists saw two problems with surrogacy contracts that weighed against
enforcement and in favor of a ban. First, they argued that surrogates’ decisions
were made under duress; this concern is captured in the frequent claim that
these contracts exploited women.143 In their view, surrogates were women with
few options for meeting compelling financial needs, which made them
vulnerable to exploitation by intermediaries.144 As the New Jersey Supreme
Court noted in Baby M, this concern also arises in the context of adoption, in
which it is the rationale for not allowing intermediaries to receive payment for
adoption placement and for prohibiting pre-birth consent to adoption by birth
mothers.145 In the context of surrogacy, in which the exigencies are less urgent,

139. Bartlett, supra note 138, at 333 (“[Surrogacy] presupposes that the biological mother–child
bond is easily severed, that pregnancy and childbirth is a process which does not necessarily entail
enduring human emotion and permanent connectedness, that women can have children and give them
up if the price is right . . . .”); Jackson, supra note 138, at 1818–20.
140. This points to a division within feminist theory. Liberal feminists have tended to emphasize
gender equality and focus on women as autonomous individuals, while relational (or “difference”)
feminists emphasize women’s nurturing and relational tendencies, which distinguish them from men.
See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S
DEVELOPMENT (1982). Martha Fineman argues that lawmakers should protect the “mother-child
dyad” as the core family relationship. See generally MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER,
THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).
141. Many surrogates who are happy with their involvement in surrogacy arrangements offer this
description of their decision. See Kelley, supra note 9; Schulte, supra note 9.
142. See Pollitt, supra note 34, at 685 (“If [commercial surrogacy] becomes a socially acceptable way
for a wife to help out the family budget, how can the law protect women from being coerced into
contracts by their husbands?”).
143. E.g., Anderson, supra note 16, at 81–82; Pollitt, supra note 34, at 684–85.
144. Pollitt, supra note 34, at 688 (arguing that if surrogacy contracts were unenforceable, the “real
loser . . . would be the baby-broker . . . and that would be a very good thing”).
145. See In the Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1241, 1244–45 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1987) (noting the
risks of “baby-bartering” when intermediaries accept money for arranging adoptions; construing “the
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this claim may assume that most women would not agree to undertake what is
seen as a degrading service were it not for their extreme need and lack of other
opportunities to earn money. This theme is also heard in arguments against
legalizing prostitution, an issue that has generated considerable debate among
feminists.146 Alternatively, surrogates who willingly entered these arrangements
believing that they were performing a valuable service were considered likely to
be subject to self deception generated by a patriarchal society.147
Many feminists also viewed surrogacy contracts to be defective for lack of
informed consent, because women entering surrogacy contracts often would not
be able to anticipate the substantial risk that they would later regret the
agreement to give up the child. Surrogates might not understand that they were
likely to form a bond with their children during pregnancy that could make
relinquishment extremely difficult.148 Scholars have described limits on an
individual’s ability to anticipate future emotional reactions, arguing that
deficiencies in “affective forecasting” undermine informed decisionmaking and
may justify non-enforcement of agreements.149 In the context of surrogacy, many
opponents argued that the risk of regret by the surrogate was very great—and
was a good reason not to allow the agreements.150

child named therein” in New Jersey’s adoption statutes to refer only to a child that has been born, not
to a fetus or a planned child); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3-39.1, -41 (West 2008) (adoption statute
prohibiting payment to intermediary for placement of a child for adoption).
146. Some feminists favor banning prostitution, as a degrading occupation that exploits women and
values them only for their sexuality. But others argue that women should be free to decide to engage in
sexual activity for profit and oppose paternalistic regulation. Compare Catherine A. MacKinnon,
Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination, 71 B.U. L. REV. 793 (1991) (favoring regulation), with
NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN’S
RIGHTS (1995) (opposing restrictions).
147. Margaret Radin argues that surrogates who feel fulfilled in the role may be subject to “ironic
self deception,” and “may actually be reinforcing oppressive gender roles.” Intended mothers also are
potentially subject to “false consciousness,” believing they should raise their partners’ genetic children.
See Radin, supra note 16, at 1930–31.
148. MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: THE LEGAL AND HUMAN ISSUES 71–72
(1988) (discussing the difficulty some surrogates have in parting with a baby); Bartlett, supra note 138,
at 333 (describing the bond that develops during pregnancy); Jackson, supra note 138, at 1819 (“[I]t
may be quite difficult, even impossible, accurately to evaluate, prior to birth, the ability to surrender
the child.”); Linda J. Lacey, The Law of Artificial Insemination and Surrogate Parenthood in
Oklahoma: Roadblocks to the Right to Procreate, 22 TULSA L.J. 281, 317 (1987) (arguing that because
woman cannot know the pain of separating with a child, “she should not be bound to a provision
forcing her to relinquish the child”); Pollitt, supra note 34, at 684.
149. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problem of Affective Forecasting, 80 IND.
L.J. 155, 209–11 (2005) (arguing that individuals often inaccurately forecast future emotional states, and
that this deficiency is a reason not to enforce surrogacy contracts); Jackson, supra note 138, at 1819
(arguing that women may not anticipate regret about relinquishing a child); Molly J. Walker Wilson,
Precommitment in Free-Market Procreation: Surrogacy, Commissioned Adoption, and Limits on
Human Decision Making Capacity, 31 J. LEGIS. 329, 329–30 (2005) (arguing that consent can never be
informed because a woman cannot accurately predict how she will feel when giving the child up to the
intended parents).
150. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 16, at 1930.
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The prediction that many women would regret their decisions to enter
surrogacy contracts gained force, in part, because the issue was first considered
in the context of Baby M, in which the surrogate did experience great regret.
Feminists are as susceptible to the availability heuristic as anyone else, and it
seems likely that vivid images of Ms. Whitehead’s anguish at being separated
from her child influenced their views. The argument that women should have
the freedom to make these decisions might have gained greater traction with
some feminists had the issue not been complicated by the unfortunate outcome
in Baby M. But the prediction also resonated for some feminists because regret
in this context seemed like a mother’s natural response. The notion that the
typical surrogate would coolly relinquish her child conflicted with an ideology
of motherhood under which pregnancy was seen as a unique experience
through which a “sacred bond” develops between mother and child.151 In this
way at least, feminist concerns about surrogacy overlapped with those of social
conservatives.152
In sum, many feminists viewed surrogacy transactions as inherently
degrading to women; they assumed that the contracts were executed because
women were coerced by exigent circumstances or false consciousness and
because they could not anticipate the adverse consequences of their choices.
For these reasons, feminists in the political arena argued either that surrogacy
arrangements should be prohibited or that women should not be bound by
these contracts.
There is another piece to the puzzle of feminists’ active involvement in the
political movement to prohibit surrogacy arrangements. The evidence indicates
that feminists coalesced in support of Ms. Whitehead and against surrogacy
because they saw the case as typical of contested custody disputes in which
loving mothers lost their children to more-powerful fathers. Although the legal
issue in Baby M was whether the surrogacy contract should be enforced, in
many ways, the trial played out as a custody adjudication between the biological
parents, with much expert testimony about which party would be a better
parent to the child.153 Feminists and women’s groups mobilized in response to
their perception that Ms. Whitehead’s parenting abilities were being unfairly
scrutinized and criticized, while Mr. Stern was presumed to be competent to
assume the parental role, despite his lack of experience.154

151. Phyllis Chesler, a leading surrogacy activist, titled her book about Baby M, “Sacred Bond.”
CHESLER, supra note 39; see also Bartlett, supra note 138, at 333–34 (discussing the assumption that a
strong mother–child bond will be formed during pregnancy as part of the ideology of custody law and
challenging the wisdom of facilitating the severance of that relationship for cash); Pollitt, supra note 34,
at 684 (“Within custody law, there is a strong ideology that through pregnancy and childbirth an
enduring bond develops between mother and child which cannot easily be broken.”).
152. See LUKER, supra note 132, at 197–215 (describing religious conservatives’ attitude about the
importance of motherhood in women’s identity).
153. See Peterson, supra note 31 and sources cited supra note 34 (describing objections to criticisms
of Ms. Whitehead’s parenting skills).
154. See Peterson, supra note 31 and sources cited supra note 34.
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Child-custody decisionmaking was an important issue on the feminist
agenda in the 1980s. The “tender years” presumption favoring mothers over
fathers in custody disputes had been replaced in most states by the genderneutral “best interest of the child” standard.155 Although the empirical evidence
is mixed, feminists argued that under the best-interest standard, primarycaretaker mothers often lost adjudicated custody disputes to wealthier, morepowerful fathers.156 Many antisurrogacy feminists saw the Whitehead–Stern
dispute as one more example of mothers’ losing struggle to keep their children
in an unfair patriarchal system.157 Phyllis Chesler, a long-time critic of the legal
system’s treatment of mothers in child-custody cases, was one of the most active
feminist supporters of Ms. Whitehead and a determined advocate for banning
surrogacy arrangements. She explicitly framed the case as a typical custody
dispute riddled with gender bias, with the predictable trial-court decision.158
Many feminists in the political arena appear to have conflated surrogacy and
child custody in the context of this compelling case. In opposing these
transactions generally, they may have assumed that such biased proceedings
would be the norm if surrogacy contracts were allowed.
Although surrogacy was sometimes described as a hard issue for feminists,
ultimately women’s groups spoke virtually with one voice in the political arena
during the Baby M period and thereafter for several years.159 Given the
complexity of the issues and the early divisions among feminists, this lack of
dissent warrants some examination.
The literature on public-opinion formation and expression offers an
explanation of this unified response. Timur Kuran argues that when expressions
of public opinion coalesce around a dominant position, individuals whose
preferences are inconsistent with that view may be silenced through a
mechanism that he calls a “reputational cascade.”160 This happens, according to
155. Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child
Custody Determinations, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 235, 236 (1982).
156. See id. (citing studies showing fathers winning between 38% and 63% of disputed custody
cases). Overall, about 10% of children were in their fathers’ custody in the early 1990s. ELEANOR E.
MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF
CUSTODY 168 (1992).
157. See Peterson, supra note 31 (describing feminists’ anger at the trial and the expert testimony
about Whitehead).
158. CHESLER, supra note 39, at 11, 16, 97. The year before the trial court’s decision in Baby M,
Chesler published a study of custody trials that focused on mothers who lost custody. PHYLLIS
CHESLER, MOTHERS ON TRIAL: THE BATTLE FOR CHILDREN AND CUSTODY (1986).
159. See supra notes 40–46 and accompanying text. Although few feminist opponents of surrogacy
regulation spoke out in the political arena, some academic feminists argued against restrictions on
surrogacy agreements. See Andrews, supra note 135, at 74–76 (challenging feminist arguments based on
exploitation and risk of regret); Marjorie Maguire Schultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 346 (1990) (arguing for
contractual enforcement of surrogacy agreements because effecting parties’ intentions advances gender
equality).
160. See generally TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES
OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION (1995) [hereinafter KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS]; Timur Kuran, Ethic
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Kuran, because individuals seek to avoid the social disapproval and censure
that may follow the expression of an unpopular view.161 As support for a
dominant view gains force, the cost of dissent rises, and individuals with
nuanced or even opposing views may be reluctant to speak out.162 Reluctance
may be particularly likely for those who identify generally with the perspective
of opinion leaders or who are reluctant to affiliate with opponents.163 This
response can contribute to the impression that public opinion supporting the
dominant position is stronger than is in fact the case.164 In a circular process, this
makes dissent appear to be even more costly and reinforces the perception that
the prevailing opinion represents a strong social consensus.165
This analysis may suggest why feminists with reservations about support for
Ms. Whitehead and the antisurrogacy reforms did not push their views in the
political arena. In the midst of the moral panic surrounding Baby M, activists
and opinion leaders such as Chesler moved quickly and successfully to frame
surrogacy as an exploitative practice that posed a substantial threat to women
and to motherhood. Feminists who contemplated challenging this position
might well have anticipated that they would incur substantial reputational costs.
As the antisurrogacy availability cascade gained momentum, a more tolerant
stance may have become uncomfortable for feminist skeptics. To oppose
restrictions on surrogacy was to be antiwoman, allied with brokers and fathers
against poor mothers and other feminists. Not surprisingly perhaps, in this
political environment, few feminists openly expressed reservations about
policies restricting the freedom of parties to enter surrogacy arrangements,
although at a theoretical level such policies might be seen to be in tension with
feminist values.166
IV
THE COLLAPSE OF COMMODIFICATION: REFRAMING SURROGACY
Since the early 1990s, surrogacy has been largely reframed as a social and
political issue, setting the stage for contemporary lawmakers to approach these
arrangements pragmatically rather than punitively. Several factors have
contributed to the change. First, the moral panic surrounding Baby M
predictably dissipated, creating an environment more open to reflective
consideration of surrogacy regulation. Surrogacy and the new reproductive
Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputational Cascades, 27 J.L. STUDIES 623 (1998). See also
Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 111, at 727–29.
161. KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, supra note 160, at 60–69.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 60–69, 105–10.
165. Id.
166. One exception was academic Lori Andrews, who spoke out in support of the trial court’s
decision. See Editorial, Baby M Decision Spurs Wide Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1987, at E1 (noting
Andrews’ support of the Baby M decision granting custody to the Sterns); see also Andrews, supra note
135.
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technologies became more familiar and, with familiarity, have seemed less
threatening. This happened in part because the predicted harms of commercial
surrogacy have largely failed to materialize, so claims of commodification no
longer seem as compelling as they once did. The framing of surrogacy as baby
selling has also lost force as traditional surrogacy has been supplanted by
gestational surrogacy in recent years.167 Finally, whatever its theoretical merits,
the commodification argument against commercial surrogacy may have become
unpalatable for feminists and liberals in the political arena because pro-life
advocates have used uncomfortably similar women-protective arguments
successfully in favor of restricting abortion. The withdrawal of women’s
advocates has altered the political dynamic, as has the growth of prosurrogacy
interest groups who frame surrogacy as a socially beneficial practice.
A. The Dissipation of the Moral Panic: The Changing Political Climate
Moral panics always diminish in intensity over time as the salient incidents
and images that stirred alarm recede in public consciousness.168 Thus,
predictably, after the New Jersey Supreme Court decision, public interest in
surrogacy and outrage about baby selling and the exploitation of women
gradually waned as the media, politicians, and the public turned their attention
to other matters. The New York legislative reform in 1992 briefly revived
interest in the issue, with advocates again invoking images of Baby M. But
interest quickly declined again and, by 1994, sponsors of a New Jersey law
banning surrogacy could not even generate enough interest to bring the bill
before the legislature.169
Moral panics sometimes recur periodically as new incidents revive public
fears, but this has not happened in the case of surrogacy. Occasionally, horror
stories of surrogacy agreements gone awry are reported in the press, but even
the 1995 murder of a baby by his abusive, genetic father shortly after the child
was relinquished by the surrogate failed to generate a political backlash.170 In
recent years, no interest group has sought to create a new availability cascade
with the goal of mobilizing support for new restrictions on the practice.
In part, this relative quietude simply reflects a growing familiarity with
surrogacy and other reproductive technologies that were new in the 1980s and
therefore frightening to many people. Familiarity has assuaged fears about the
potential of these scientific innovations to undermine conventional
understandings of marriage, family formation, and human identity. This
response was not unique to surrogacy or to the 1980s. For example,
pharmaceutical contraceptives were greeted with alarm when they were
167. See Sanger, supra note 35, at 140.
168. GOODE & BEN-YEHUDA, supra note 102, at 38 (describing how moral panics erupt and
subside quickly).
169. Diamond, supra note 73.
170. See Huddleston v. Infertility Ctr. of America, Inc., 700 A.2d 453, 455–56 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997)
(wrongful-death action by the surrogate mother against the infertility clinic that screened the father).
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introduced in the 1930s but gradually gained public acceptance as helpful family
planning aids.171 As surrogacy arrangements and other means of assisted
reproduction lost their novelty, public concern about their potential threat
diminished and the social environment was no longer conducive to generating
intense opposition.
B. Undermining the Commodification Frame
In large part, familiarity with surrogacy arrangements alleviated public fears
because many predictions of harmful consequences made by opponents in the
midst of the Baby M controversy proved to be exaggerated or wrong,
undermining the characterization of commercial-surrogacy contracts as
exploitative, baby-selling transactions. At one level, of course, the harms of
commodification are abstract and not subject to empirical validation. How
could it be determined whether surrogacy has changed the way that children or
women’s reproductive capacity is valued? But little evidence confirms the
predictions of more concrete harms associated with the “sale” of children and
the exploitation of women who act as surrogates. Since the mid-1990s, the
empirical research and anecdotal accounts in the media have offered a more
benign account of surrogacy than that which prevailed earlier, assuaging fears
about these transactions.172
Here is the picture that emerges. Most American surrogates are not as
wealthy as the intended parents, but few are poor.173 Many report using the
money they receive to enhance their families’ welfare in conventional ways,
often indicating that they value the ability to earn money while staying home
with their children.174 Further, few surrogates report reluctance to relinquish the
child, and a very small percentage express regret about having served in the
role.175 Contrary to the claim that surrogacy degrades motherhood and
pregnancy, the available evidence suggests that surrogates view themselves as

171. Contraceptives were seen as a serious threat to the family, and calls for banning the drugs were
common. Debora L. Spar, For Love and Money: The Political Economy of Commercial Surrogacy, 12
REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 287, 305–06 (2005).
172. Hazel Basilington, The Social Organization of Surrogacy: Relinquishing a Baby and the Role of
Payment in the Psychological Detachment Process, 7 J. HEALTH PSYCHOL. 57 (2002) (study of attitudes
toward relinquishment); Janice C. Ciccarreli & Linda J. Beckman, Navigating Rough Waters: An
Overview of Psychological Aspects of Surrogacy, 61 J. SOC. ISSUES 21 (2005) (reviewing studies of
surrogacy); see also popular media sources cited supra note 9.
173. Kelley, supra note 9. However, Indian women, who indeed may be poor, also serve as
surrogates for American couples. See Abigail Haworth, Surrogate Mothers: Wombs to Rent, MARIE
CLAIRE, available at http://www.marieclaire.com/world-reports/news/international/surrogate-mothersindia (last visited May 8, 2009).
174. Kelley, supra note 9 (describing military wives with husbands away on active duty volunteering
to act as surrogates).
175. See Ciccarreli & Beckman, supra note 172, at 31–32 (describing studies showing most
surrogates reported satisfaction with experience); Kelley, supra note 9.
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performing a service of great social value for the benefit of others.176 Further,
little evidence indicates that children born of surrogacy arrangements suffer
psychological or physical harm because of the circumstances of their birth, or
that surrogates’ other children fear that they too will be relinquished.177 Melissa
Stern herself appears to have bonded securely with her intended parents; as an
adult, she reportedly terminated Ms. Whitehead’s parental rights so that Ms.
Stern could adopt her.178 The evidence tends to support the argument of
prosurrogacy advocates that infertile couples eager to have children are not
likely to be seriously deficient parents.
With the passing of time, it became clear that bad outcomes like that of
Baby M were exceptional rather than typical, and that the cases that generated
alarm could usually be avoided through clear legal rules and requirements
aimed at protecting all participants. For example, disputes of various kinds over
parental rights and responsibilities (including custody battles and efforts by one
or both intended parents to default on the surrogacy contract and on their
parental obligations) are less likely to arise under laws that clearly assign
parental status to the intended parents at birth. Further, concerns about undue
influence by brokers or intended parents and about the voluntariness of
surrogates’ consent and their emotional suitability can be mitigated through
well-designed regulations.
C. Gestational Contracts: From Surrogate Mothers to Gestational Carriers
The prevalence of gestational surrogacy in recent years has been a very
important factor in dismantling the commodification frame and in changing the
way many people, including lawmakers and lobbyists, view these arrangements.
Today, ninety-five percent of surrogacy contracts involve IVF, so most
surrogates are not the genetic mothers of the children they bear.179 As described
earlier, several contemporary laws limit access to procedures for efficiently
establishing intended parent’s rights to gestational-surrogacy contracts, and
courts typically give intended parents’ claims more weight when the surrogate is
not the child’s genetic parent. The evidence suggests that surrogates themselves
see this distinction as important in defining their relationships with the children
they will relinquish. As one gestational surrogate put it, “I don’t feel that
motherly bond. I feel more like a caring baby sitter.”180
176. Ciccarreli & Beckman, supra note 172, at 29–30 (describing surrogates reported altruistic
motivation); Sanger, supra note 35, at 137 (noting that many women are honored and happy to serve as
surrogates for infertile couples).
177. No studies exist on children conceived using surrogacy. Studies of children conceived by other
forms of assisted reproduction suggest that the circumstances of birth do not negatively affect
development. Ciccarreli & Beckman, supra note 172, at 37.
178. Jennifer Weiss, Now It’s Melissa’s Time, N.J. MONTHLY MAG., Mar. 2007, available at http://
www.reproductivelawyer.com/news/babym.asp. In her only interview, Melissa offered warm praise of
her parents, Bill and Betsy Stern. Id.
179. Sanger, supra note 35, at 140.
180. See Kelley, supra note 9.
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The move to gestational surrogacy has facilitated the change in the social
meaning of surrogacy from a mother’s sale of her baby to a transaction
involving the provision of gestational services. It is telling that gestational
surrogates are often described as “carriers,” rather than as “mothers.”181
Although some have challenged the commodification argument all along on the
ground that fathers who execute surrogacy contracts cannot “buy” their own
children, 182 this objection gained little traction as long as mothers were seen as
selling their children. Because the gestational surrogate lacks a biological
connection with the child she is nurturing and bearing, her identity as the child’s
mother is less powerful.183 The conclusion that the child is not in fact her child,
but rather that she is providing contractual gestational services to the “actual”
parents, resonates with many people.184
This change in social meaning seems to have evolved in a two-step process.
In Calvert, the first important gestational surrogacy case, both intended parents
were the child’s genetic parents. This carried great weight with the court and
made the intended mothers’ claim of parental status compelling.185 Soon,
however, many state laws granted parental status to intended parents under
gestational-surrogacy arrangements even when only one intended parent was
the child’s genetic parent.186 Thus it appears that gestational surrogacy has
reshaped the social meaning of these arrangements by diminishing the maternal
181. See J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1270 (D. Utah 2002) (describing surrogate’s services as
“a gestational carrier surrogate” ); Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1137
(Mass. 2001) (referring to the surrogate as the “gestational carrier”); see also Noa Ben-Asher, The
Curing Law: On the Legal Evolution of Baby-Making Markets 30 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law &
Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper No. 08-167), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1095448
(arguing the importance of this distinction).
182. Richard A. Eptein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV.
2305, 2331 (2005) (pointing out that child is father’s own child); Barbara Katz Rothman, Reproductive
Technologies and Surrogacy: A Feminist Perspective, 25 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1599, 1603 (1992)
(describing but challenging this argument).
183. In the floor debate in the Illinois House, Barbara Currie, the sponsor of the GSA, reassured
her colleagues: “In a situation where the birth mother . . . provided the egg that results in this baby,
there is no way you can’t grant her the opportunity to change her mind at the 11th hour. But the
woman in a gestational surrogacy program . . . has no biological connection to the child.” H.R. 111, 93rd
Gen. Assem., 22, at 23 (Ill. 2004).
184. Legal scholars have also drawn a distinction between traditional and gestational surrogacy. See
Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of
Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 898 (2000) (arguing that traditional surrogacy agreements
should be subject to the same legal standard as adoption because the surrogate is in fact the child’s
mother, but that the surrogate has no similar claim in a gestational-surrogacy agreement).
185. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781–83 (Cal. 1993); see supra notes 81–87 and accompanying
text.
186. Most gestational surrogacy statutes require that one intended parent be the child’s genetic
parent; a few, including North Dakota, require both intended parents to be genetic parents. Compare
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20(b)(1) (2006) (intended parents must “contribute at least one of the gametes
resulting in a pre-embryo that the gestational surrogate will attempt to carry to term”), with N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 (2008) (“‘Gestational carrier’ means an adult woman who enters into an
agreement to have an embryo implanted in her and bear the resulting child for intended parents, where
the embryo is conceived by using the egg and sperm of the intended parents.”).
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credentials of the surrogate, rather than by enhancing those of the intended
mother. This is interesting and a bit puzzling, given that critics of surrogacy
have often emphasized the mother–child bond formed in pregnancy as the
foundation of the surrogate’s parental claim and the source of her predictable
regret in relinquishing the child.187
The relatively positive response to gestational surrogacy suggests that
gestational motherhood is devalued when it is separated from genetic
parenthood—and perhaps that surrogates who are not also genetic mothers,
unlike traditional surrogates, might be expected not to form a maternal bond
with a child who “belongs” to others.188 This widespread reaction goes some
distance toward explaining the reframing of surrogacy, but it has some troubling
implications. First, it raises questions about the value of pregnancy relative to
other dimensions of motherhood and the extent to which the mother–child
bond formed during this period is assumed to be a product of the genetic tie
rather than of the nurturing relationship.189 It also recalls a long-rejected notion
that parents have a property-like interest in their children based on biology.
Nonetheless, it seems clear that the supplanting of traditional surrogacy by
gestational contracts has contributed to public acceptance of surrogacy
arrangements.
The benign framing of gestational surrogacy has been reinforced further
under new statutory requirements that intended parents demonstrate a medical
need for surrogacy.190 In the Baby M period, surrogacy was sometimes
characterized as a self-indulgent effort by wealthy couples to avoid the
inconvenience of pregnancy and childbirth.191 The medical-need requirement
signals the parents’ legitimate purpose in turning to surrogacy and underscores
the value of the service as an essential means of achieving a widely shared goal
of having genetically related children.192
The availability of gestational surrogacy also has had a tangible effect on
surrogacy practice. The disaggregation of gestational from genetic parenthood

187. See sources cited supra note 148.
188. Some feminists argue that maternity rests on nurturance in pregnancy and not the genetic tie.
See generally BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND
TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY (1989).
189. Critics of surrogacy often emphasize the importance of the mother–child relationship formed
during pregnancy in arguing against contract enforcement. See Bartlett, supra note 138, at 333–34; Katz
Rothman, supra note 182, at 1607 (emphasizing the importance of pregnancy as social relationship
between surrogate and child).
190. FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (2008) (intended mother must be unable to safely carry a baby to term);
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2006) (“[H]e, she, or they have a medical need for the gestational
surrogacy . . . .”); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §160.756(b)(2) (2008) (A court may only validate a
gestational surrogacy agreement if “medical evidence provided shows that the intended mother is
unable to carry a pregnancy to term.”).
191. See supra note 125 (describing skeptical comments about Ms. Stern’s motivation in pursuing
surrogacy).
192. See Ben-Asher, supra note 181, at 34–42 (arguing that reproductive technologies (including
surrogacy) become socially accepted when they are viewed as cures for infertility).
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has increased both the demand for surrogacy and the willingness of women to
fill this role. Prospective parents may be more willing to enter these
arrangements than traditional ones because they can exercise greater control
over their child’s genetic make-up.193 Further, their “requirements” in choosing
surrogates are simpler—good health and a willingness to live a healthy lifestyle
during the pregnancy. At the same time, more women are willing to be
surrogates when it does not mean giving up their biological children.
D. The Withdrawal of Feminists and Liberals: Coercion as a Double-Edged
Sword
Among the most notable changes in the political landscape of surrogacy in
recent years has been the absence of feminist voices, women’s groups, and civilliberties organizations. Although it is difficult to find direct evidence of a
change of heart on this issue or an explanation of why it happened, it seems
likely that changes in the politics of abortion may have played an important
role.
The feminist position on surrogacy in the Baby M period always seemed to
be in tension with the commitment to preserving women’s autonomy in other
reproductive contexts—particularly abortion. The claim that women lacked
agency because of coercive circumstances was unsettling, but even morediscordant with feminist values was the assertion that women needed protection
because they could not anticipate their response to pregnancy. Such an
assertion suggested views about the power of female biology that historically
contributed to women’s subordination—views that feminists have challenged in
fighting for gender equality. The prediction that women were likely to regret
their surrogacy decision on the basis of “natural” biological and psychological
urges embodied essentialist assumptions about the role of motherhood in
women’s lives.194
At the time of Baby M, these concerns hovered in the background, the
source of unease for a few liberal feminists, but were overwhelmed by support
for Ms. Whitehead and opposition to surrogacy. In recent years, however,
arguments against surrogacy based on the threat of coercion and regret have
become untenable for most feminists because anti-abortion advocates have
invoked similar arguments. Recognizing that many people were offended by
their standard “baby killing” argument, abortion opponents began to shift to
what Reva Siegel calls a “women-protective” rationale for banning abortion.195

193. SPAR, supra note 79, at 78–82. (“[O]nce IVF raised the prospect of selling eggs apart from
pregnancy, supply began to grow.”).
194. See generally Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 181 (2001) (describing and challenging the central importance of motherhood in
legal-feminist thought).
195. Reva Siegel, The Rights’ Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Women-Protective
Anti-Abortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1642 (2008) (describing the “women-protective” rationale
in the Carhart decision).
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This argument has gained traction in the political arena and in litigation—it was
endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Gonzalez v. Carhart in 2007 as a
justification for restricting abortion.196
The women-protective argument includes two distinct but related claims:
First, abortion opponents argue that boyfriends, family, and clinic staff coerce
and mislead women to obtain abortions that they would never voluntarily
obtain—because “[it] is so far outside the normal conduct of a mother to
implicate herself in the killing her own child.”197 Second, and for the same
reason, opponents argue that many women deeply regret their abortions,
suffering from psychological trauma which puts them at risk for severe
depression and “post-abortion syndrome,” a form of post-traumatic stress
disorder.198 This claim has taken hold even though it is based largely on
anecdotal evidence and has little support in legitimate social-science research.199
According to pro-life advocates, women must be protected from this harm by
prohibiting abortion altogether.200
These paternalistic arguments closely track claims made against surrogacy in
the Baby M period. Surrogacy arrangements also were assumed to be coerced,
on the view that few women would undertake them in the absence of dire
financial circumstances.201 Surrogacy opponents also argued that the risk of
regret was substantial in the surrogacy context because most mothers would not
voluntarily relinquish their children. Although one cannot trace the genealogy
of the anti-abortion argument to the surrogacy debate, they likely have a
common source: Mary Beth Whitehead’s attorney, Harold Cassidy, has been
among the most prominent proponents of the women-protective argument
against abortion in recent years.202
Although surrogacy raised legitimate concerns for feminists203 (not so
different in some ways from prostitution),204 the unified stance in response to
Baby M was driven, at least in part, by sympathy for Ms. Whitehead and anger
at apparent class and gender bias against her as the case played out. The
withdrawal of women’s advocates implicitly recognizes that endorsing
paternalistic government restrictions on women’s reproductive choices in this
196. Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“[S]ome women come to regret the choice they
make to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.”) The women-protective argument also
persuaded the South Dakota legislature to ban abortion, an enactment later defeated by voter
referendum. See Siegel, supra note 195, at 1642.
197. S.D. Task Force to Study Abortion, Report of the South Dakota Task Force to Study Abortion
56 (2005), available at http://www.voteyesforlife.com/docs/Task_Force_Report.pdf (cited in Siegel,
supra note 195, at 1163).
198. Siegel, supra note 195, at 1649.
199. Id. at 1653 n.44.
200. Id. at 1652 (noting that the South Dakota report expressed concerns that women would receive
“abortions they do not want, and in all events, should not have”).
201. In the Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1241 (N.J. 1988).
202. Siegel, supra note 195, at 1646 n.16.
203. See supra notes 138–139 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 142.

06_SCOTT_BOOK PROOF.DOC

144

11/9/2009 1:22:51 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 72:109

context is incompatible with the broader feminist political agenda. In contrast
to abortion, surrogacy was not a core issue for feminists; ultimately it became
clear that support for restrictions on surrogacy undermined pro-choice
advocacy.
E. A New Balance of Power
After feminist interest in surrogacy waned, opposition was limited to
religious and social conservatives, and even for this group, surrogacy likely was
a minor issue compared to abortion, gay marriage, or divorce reform. This may
explain the relative lack of controversy in the recent law-reform initiatives. At
the same time, the popularity of gestational surrogacy and IVF as responses to
infertility has increased.205 This has led to the growth of interest groups aiming
to facilitate legal certainty about the parental status of adults who acquire
children through assisted reproduction; thus, parent’s groups and intermediaries
have played an active role in lobbying for the new laws.206
The responsiveness of legislatures to this new coalition of interest groups is
not surprising. As compared to abortion, surrogacy has never been a highly
polarizing political issue with powerful factions competing to shape the law. In
the Baby M period, there was little support for allowing the novel arrangements
and, with the dissipation of moral panic and the rise of gestational surrogacy,
few well-funded or emotionally invested opponents have emerged. This may
explain the pragmatic approach of contemporary lawmakers, who seem to
accept that surrogacy and other new reproductive technologies are here to stay,
and to believe that the utility of these arrangements can be enhanced through
regulation clearly establishing parental status in intended parents.207
This is not to say that concern about commodification in this context is
altogether assuaged or that any normative consensus exists about surrogacy.
The growing number of individuals who satisfy powerful urges to form families
and have children through commercial transactions continues to be a source of
concern for ethicists, particularly given the recent trend to “outsource” the
contracts to India and other countries where surrogates may indeed be poor
women who have few other income options.208 Moreover, some scholars are
concerned that the expense of gestational surrogacy effectively limits this
family-formation option to high-income couples and individuals.209 However, the
205. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
206. Among the groups that have played an advocacy role in promoting law reform in recent years
is Resolve, a group of parents and infertility professionals. See RESOLVE: The National Infertility
Association, http://www.resolve.org (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
207. See supra notes 90–97 and accompanying text (discussing passage of Illinois Gestational
Surrogacy Act).
208. See Haworth, supra note 173 (describing a clinic in India arranging for local women to act as
surrogates for Americans at a fraction of the U.S. cost).
209. See Ben-Asher, supra note 181, at 142 (arguing that traditional surrogacy should be allowed
because only wealthy people can afford gestational surrogacy). Readers responding to Alex
Kuczynski’s New York Times article about her experience acquiring a child through surrogacy, supra
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goal of assisted reproduction is relatively benign, and the emerging view among
lawmakers seems to be that regulation is a better means of minimizing the costs
than a legal vacuum.
V
LESSONS FOR LAWMAKERS
This account of the political and legal history of surrogacy over more than
two decades shows lawmakers responding to the issue in two very different
settings. In the Baby M period, courts and legislatures, reacting to the moral
panic that surrounded that case, framed surrogacy as degrading
commodification. Recent judicial and legislative responses have been much
more practical, with lawmakers seeking to minimize the social costs
(particularly costs to children) associated with these transactions. Although
some advocates continue to support the earlier, restrictive approach, lawmakers
increasingly favor regulation over prohibition as a more effective means of
promoting social welfare in this context. This may reflect an emerging dominant
view that legal prohibition of a practice that carries little tangible harm if
properly regulated is hard to justify.
In any event, few would argue that lawmaking in the midst of a moral panic
is optimal. The exaggerated perceptions of risk generated by availability
cascades almost invariably distort official responses, and government action
itself can institutionalize the moral panic. This dynamic is certainly not unique
to surrogacy or to innovations in reproductive technology. It can be seen in the
response to child sexual abuse, juvenile crime, nuclear power, and even madcow disease.210 In many instances, high-profile incidents focus public attention
on an issue, generating alarm and cries for the government to “do something—
now.” Lawmaking under conditions of intense political pressure will seldom
promote society’s long-term interests.
Does the history of surrogacy as a political issue offer any general lessons
for responding to issues that generate moral panics? At a minimum, the story
clarifies that with the passage of time, moral panics tend to dissipate and
political pressure for government action tends to weaken. For the most part,
legislatures that did not act in the midst of the Baby M furor did not later pass
restrictive legislation. In some states, the political climate cooled and bills died
without a vote. The New Jersey experience is instructive: by the time the task
force issued its report and sponsors introduced the bill banning surrogacy,
political pressure and legislative interest had disappeared.
The passage of time allows the political climate to cool, but it can also serve
another useful purpose. An extensive period dedicated to acquiring accurate
note 9, criticized the cover picture of the author in front of her Hamptons home featuring the baby’s
nurse standing at attention nearby. Letters to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 16, 2008, at 16.
210. See generally Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 111 (describing many situations, such as the panic
surrounding Love Canal, in which distorted perceptions of risk generate availability cascades that lead
to excessively restrictive regulation).
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information and to deliberation provides the opportunity to correct distortions
created by availability cascades. Legislative hearings, cost-benefit analyses, and
the establishment of task forces to undertake in-depth studies of issues can all
function to facilitate better decisionmaking by lawmakers.211 These mechanisms
might be particularly useful in contexts in which relevant (and available)
information is likely to be ignored due to the vivid salience of an incident or
case that has captured public attention. In other settings—and surrogacy may
be one—when the novelty of an issue generates alarm and uncertainty, and
when dire predictions cannot be immediately proved or disproved, a period of
watchful observation may either allay concerns or clarify the need for restrictive
regulation. In the case of reproductive technology, the accumulation of
information and experience has alleviated much of the fear that innovations
offering individuals increased control over family formation pose a serious
threat to core social values.
The history of surrogacy also suggests that the political costs of moving
slowly in response to a moral panic may be less serious than lawmakers
anticipate. As an availability cascade builds and public fears escalate, politicians
may conclude that their only option is to satisfy the demand for action by
responding quickly to the perceived threat. But moral panics are volatile, and
the period of intense concern is predictably short lived. The public and the
media move on to other issues, and even interest groups may adjust their
political agendas and priorities in ways that divert their focus to other matters.
Thus, the prescribed response to moral panics of careful study and deliberation
over an extended period of time is often politically feasible as well as conducive
to better policymaking.
VI
CONCLUSION
The history of the changing social and political meaning of surrogacy
provides an interesting case study that may offer useful insights for
policymakers. The contemporary pragmatic approach to regulating surrogacy,
in my view, is superior to the crusade-like urgency of early reformers. Of
course, this does not settle the question whether these arrangements are
morally problematic; opinion will continue to be divided on whether
commercial-surrogacy arrangements devalue children and women in intangible
ways. But what has become clear is that well-designed regulation can greatly
mitigate most of the potential tangible harms of surrogacy, and this would seem
to be the appropriate function of law in a liberal society in response to an issue
on which no societal consensus exists.

211. See proposals in Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 111, at 746–60.

